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THE NEW HABEAS CORPUS IN DEATH 
PENALTY CASES 
LARRY YACKLE* 
This article offers a systematic examination of Chapter 154, United States 
Code, which establishes new rules and procedures to govern cases in which 
state prisoners under sentence of death file federal habeas corpus petitions 
challenging their convictions or sentences.  Chapter 154 was enacted as part of 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.  Yet its provisions 
were made applicable only in capital cases arising from states that adopted 
qualifying schemes for providing indigent death row prisoners with counsel in 
state postconviction proceedings.  No state’s system for supplying lawyers in 
state court won approval and, in consequence, Chapter 154 has been on hold 
for nearly twenty years.  The Department of Justice recently revised the standards 
that state legal services programs must satisfy.  This article proceeds from the 
premise that some states will secure certification that their schemes conform and 
focuses on the interpretation the provisions in Chapter 154 should receive in 
the cases to which they apply.  At the time of enactment, the rules and 
procedures in Chapter 154 were commonly said to be favorable to states 
responding to habeas corpus petitions.  This article contends that when they 
are interpreted sensibly and pragmatically, they turn out not to create especially 
state-friendly protocols for the conduct of capital habeas litigation.  Other 
provisions in the 1996 Act and innovations since have largely stolen the show 
inasmuch as they subject all habeas cases, capital and noncapital alike, to 
essentially the same arrangements. 
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Federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, already a baffling 
labyrinth, is about to become still more intricate.  The Department of 
Justice has promulgated a Final Rule1 to implement Chapter 154 of 
Title 28, United States Code, enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).2  Chapter 154 
establishes arrangements for federal habeas actions brought by state 
prisoners under sentence of death.  At the time of enactment, these 
rules and procedures were commonly said to be “favorable to the 
state party.”3  Yet Chapter 154 specified that its provisions would 
apply only in capital cases arising from states that adopted 
qualifying schemes for providing indigent death row prisoners with 
counsel in state postconviction proceedings.  No state’s program for 
supplying lawyers in state court won approval.  In consequence, 
Chapter 154 has been on hold for nearly twenty years.  The Final 
Rule revises the standards that states must satisfy.  Some states will 
                                                          
 1. Certification Process for State Capital Counsel Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 58,183 
(Sept. 23, 2013). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
 3. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). 
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almost certainly obtain certification that their systems conform.  And 
then, its hour come round at last, a new habeas corpus for death 
penalty cases will be born. 
In this article, I bracket questions about the approval of state legal 
services programs and focus on the interpretation that Chapter 154 
should receive in the cases to which it applies.4  The Court has 
discussed some provisions in dicta to the extent they bear on other 
elements of AEDPA.  This article offers the first rigorous, systematic 
examination.  I will argue that, when Chapter 154 provisions are 
interpreted sensibly and pragmatically, they do not create especially 
state-friendly protocols for the conduct of capital habeas litigation.  
Part I traces the roots of Chapter 154 to the 1989 report of an ad hoc 
committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, chaired by 
Justice Powell.  Part II describes the interpretive approach that 
should be taken to Chapter 154.  Part III identifies the principal 
questions that will have to be addressed and offers workable answers. 
If Congress had adopted the Powell Committee report as written in 
1989 (and nothing else), capital litigation in the federal courts might 
have been significantly transformed by comparison to ordinary 
habeas adjudication.  In the event, AEDPA made major changes in 
habeas law generally, codified in Chapter 153 of Title 28, United 
States Code, and tacked on a variant of the Committee’s plan as 
Chapter 154.  In the years since, Congress has adopted further 
legislation, while the Supreme Court has both elaborated its own 
habeas doctrines and delivered important interpretations of AEDPA’s 
amendments to Chapter 153.  These innovations have largely stolen 
the show inasmuch as they typically subject the run of habeas cases to 
rules and procedures the Powell Committee planned for capital cases 
alone.  Chapter 154 will accelerate the pace at which capital litigation 
will have to be conducted.  States that employ the death penalty thus 
retain an incentive to seek certification.  Yet apart from timing rules, 
Chapter 154 will not entail restrictions on capital litigation in 
certified jurisdictions that are markedly different from the limits 
applicable to habeas cases generally, capital and noncapital alike.5 
                                                          
 4. There is a rich literature on the professional services petitioners need in 
capital litigation and the most effective means of ensuring that those needs are 
met—including the voluminous body of comments the Department of Justice 
received in the rule-making process.  See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE 
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 923, 
952 (2003).  I do not address transitional issues that will arise if and when a certified 
state contends that Chapter 154 controls a case that was under way prior to certification. 
 5. I do not mean to suggest that the interpretations for which I contend would 
amount to good public policy.  Far from it.  In my view, most of current federal 
habeas corpus law is demonstrably bad policy and ought to be thoroughly rethought.  
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I. THE ORIGINS OF CHAPTER 154 
In the middle years of the last century, critics complained that the 
federal courts’ jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus petitions from 
state convicts was both unnecessary and objectionable—unnecessary 
because state courts adequately enforced federal constitutional 
safeguards in criminal cases, objectionable because federal habeas 
adjudication compromised the finality of criminal judgments.6  
Resistance to federal habeas intensified after many states adopted 
capital punishment statutes consistent with the demands of the 
Eighth Amendment.7  Critics contended that prisoners under 
sentence of death used federal habeas petitions not to press 
potentially meritorious challenges to their convictions or sentences, 
but only to postpone their execution.8  Congress considered 
numerous bills that would have curbed the writ.9  But nothing passed. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist then took the initiative.  He appointed a 
committee of the Judicial Conference, chaired by former Justice 
Lewis Powell, and charged it to explore alternative legislative 
options.10  The Powell Committee proceeded from the premise that 
existing statutes and precedents would remain in place.11  But the 
Committee hoped Congress would adopt a freestanding package of 
recommendations to deal exclusively with three problems peculiar to 
capital cases:  resources were wasted on emergency motions for stays 
of execution pending postconviction litigation; the process in capital 
cases was freighted with repetition and delays; and lawyers often came 
into cases too late to prepare and present federal claims properly.12 
The Committee developed a plan to mandate stays routinely, to 
limit prisoners on death row to one opportunity for federal 
adjudication in most instances, and to expedite capital litigation by 
allowing only 180 days to file a federal petition.  Congress had 
recently authorized federal courts to assign counsel in federal habeas 
proceedings.13  Yet the Committee doubted that providing attorneys 
                                                          
In this article, I lay aside my reservations about extant arrangements, take them as 
they stand, and consider whether Chapter 154 threatens to make things even worse.  
 6. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE JUDGMENTS (1988), 
reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 901, 920, 975–78 (1989) (advancing these criticisms). 
 7. Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CALIF. L. REV. 2331, 2356 (1993).  
 8. Id. at 2351–52. 
 9. Id. at 2353–55, 2358–64 (describing the principal proposals). 
 10. See id. at 2367–68 (offering a fuller description of the events). 
 11. AD HOC COMM. ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS [hereinafter POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT], reprinted in 135 CONG. 
REC. 24,694 (1989).  
 12. Id. at 24,694–95. 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2012).  
YACKLE.OFF.TO.PRINTERYACKLE.FINAL TECH(DO NOT DELETE) 9/12/2014  4:42 PM 
2014] THE NEW HABEAS CORPUS IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 1795 
in federal court alone would be sufficient.14  Prisoners needed lawyers 
earlier—in state postconviction proceedings.  The Committee did not 
recommend that Congress should compel the states to provide 
counsel at that stage.  Instead, the idea was to condition the tight 
filing period and other adjustments in the process on a state’s 
agreement to supply counsel voluntarily.15  This plan came to be 
known as the “opt-in” scheme inasmuch as an individual state had a 
choice—either to continue litigating capital cases in federal court 
under existing arrangements (equally applicable to noncapital cases) 
or to obtain the benefits of the Committee’s different program for 
death penalty cases by providing indigents with counsel in previous 
proceedings in state court. 
In the years following, Congress considered more bills, many of 
them incorporating aspects of the Powell Committee’s program.16  
Then, in 1996, Congress built elements of those bills into the sweeping 
revisions in habeas law enacted as AEDPA.  The amendments to 
Chapter 153 often reproduced the Powell Committee’s plan for death 
penalty cases.  Nonetheless, Congress attached Chapter 154, which 
reflects the Committee’s optional framework for capital litigation.17 
Originally, the federal courts determined whether state 
mechanisms for supplying counsel in state court were sufficient to 
invoke Chapter 154.  Some states sought approval, but none 
succeeded.  The reasons varied, but in the main the courts faulted 
states for failing to commit the necessary resources to the enterprise.18  
Members of Congress who had hoped that Chapter 154 would apply 
to cases from their states became frustrated and proposed legislation 
transferring the responsibility to certify state programs to be in 
compliance to the Attorney General.19  The USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act made that change in 2005.20 
                                                          
 14. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,695. 
 15. Id.   
 16. See Yackle, supra note 7, at 2370–73. 
 17. H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 8 (1995) (stating that Chapter 154 “enacts the core 
recommendation of the ‘Powell Committee’”). 
 18. See John H. Blume, AEDPA:  The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 
276 (2006) (explaining that Chapter 154 was not triggered because of “the states’ 
refusal to pay the AEDPA freight”).  For a survey, see generally Burke W. Kappler, 
Small Favors:  Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the States, 
and the Right to Counsel, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467 (2000).  
 19. Rep. Lungren of California explained that “the stubborn unwillingness of the 
circuit courts to approve state counsel appointment mechanisms” moved him, along 
with Senator Kyl of Arizona, to introduce The Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, 
H.R. 3035, 109th Cong. (2005), S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005).  Daniel E. Lungren, 
Reforming the Death Penalty’s Federal Habeas Corpus Process, 2 J. INST. FOR ADVANCEMENT 
CRIM. JUST., Summer 2008, at 5, 7.   
 20. Pub. L. 109-177, § 507(b), 120 Stat. 192, 250 (2006); Lungren, supra note 19, at 9. 
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The Justice Department under President George W. Bush took 
considerable time to promulgate a rule detailing what states must do 
to win certification.21  A district court enjoined that rule on the 
ground that insufficient time had been allowed for comments.22  
Further consideration was short-circuited when the Department 
under President Obama withdrew the Bush Administration rule and 
initiated another rule-making process, which produced the current 
Final Rule.23  This rule, too, will undergo judicial review largely on 
procedural grounds.24  Objections to the Final Rule will be resolved, 
and some states are bound to be certified.25  A close examination of 
Chapter 154 is therefore in order. 
II. THE INTERPRETIVE TASK AHEAD 
The Supreme Court typically insists that the specific language in 
federal habeas statutes must be given effect.26  This on the theory that 
the text signals the only policy that can be ascribed to Congress.  Yet 
AEDPA provisions are notoriously opaque.  It is an exaggerated 
formalism that assumes something to be true when no one genuinely 
believes it, in this instance that the people who drafted AEDPA and 
the members of Congress who voted it into law knew what they were 
doing.27  They did not.  They did not understand the habeas 
jurisprudence extant at the time or envision the effects new 
provisions would have.  They did not construct an elegant web of 
mutually reinforcing provisions.28  And they were not wordsmiths.  
They did not draw provisions carefully, but employed mystifying 
                                                          
 21. Certification Process for State Capital Counsel Systems, 73 Fed. Reg. 75,327 
(Dec. 11, 2008). 
 22. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C 08-2649, 2009 WL 
185423 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009). 
 23. Certification Process for State Capital Counsel Systems, 76 Fed. Reg. 11,705 
(Mar. 3, 2011).  The Bush Administration rule failed to formulate standards for 
selecting counsel and setting their fees, instead contemplating that states would 
establish their own standards.  73 Fed. Reg. 75,331 (Dec. 11, 2008).  The current 
Final Rule includes standards meant to ensure competent and properly compensated 
counsel in state court.   
 24. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C 13-4517, 2014 WL 
3908220 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2014) (enjoining implementation of the Final Rule until 
conflicts with the Administrative Procedure Act are resolved). 
 25. Arizona purported to apply for certification even before the Final Rule was 
published.  Letter from Tom Horne, Ariz. Att’y Gen., to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y 
Gen. of the United States (Apr. 18, 2013) (on file with the author). 
 26. E.g., (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). 
 27. Cf. Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1611–13 (2012) (discussing Justice Scalia’s 
claim that the Court must “assume that Congress picks its words with care”). 
 28. Cf. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1939 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(comparing AEDPA’s “intricate craftsmanship” with the gears of a Swiss watch). 
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language that has produced conceptual confusion and heroic 
practical problems.29 
The Court has acknowledged these facts of AEDPA life and has 
compensated by exercising judgment in the face of ambiguity.  
Historically, the justices have always adjusted habeas law without 
explicit warrant in positive statutes.30  In part, they have relied on the 
writ’s “equitable” heritage, incorporated in the general provisions 
conferring habeas jurisdiction and in the longstanding direction 
from Congress to deal with habeas petitions “as law and justice 
require.”31  Much habeas corpus jurisprudence—established before 
and since 1996—takes what Congress has written as a point of 
departure, but nonetheless shoulders considerable judicial 
responsibility for the way things habeas should be.32  This is the 
approach that should be taken to Chapter 154. 
To be sure, the Court purports always to assume that provisions in 
the 1996 Act changed preexisting habeas law—usually to prisoners’ 
                                                          
 29. AEDPA’s proponents contended that the Act would make habeas corpus 
more efficient.  See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 14,524–25 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
(explaining that the bill containing AEDPA would “reform . . . federal habeas 
corpus” by “correct[ing] some of the deficiencies” in current law).  In actual 
experience, poorly conceived and drawn amendments to Chapter 153 increased the 
complexity of habeas law exponentially.  Difficulties surfaced immediately, leading to 
years of litigation that continues to this day.  Federal habeas corpus has become a 
jurisprudential Hydra, all the more vexing in that time, effort, and resources are 
squandered on procedural matters far removed from the merits of petitioners’ 
federal claims.  There is an extensive literature documenting this generalization.  See 
generally NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT:  HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS 7 (2007); see also NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 68, 71 (2011).  There is an alternative background story—
namely, that AEDPA was meant to create new procedural intricacies that state lawyers 
could exploit to defeat habeas attacks on criminal convictions and sentences, 
irrespective of the merits. In putting a question to a witness at a hearing in 2005, the 
former California attorney general boasted that his office “wrote the language which 
was adopted by the Congress” in 1996.  See Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement Act of 
2005 and the Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005:  Hearings on H.R. 3060 and H.R. 3035 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 119 (2005) (statement of Rep. Lungren). 
 30. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977) (acknowledging the Court’s 
“historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even 
where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged”). 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012); accord Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 715 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part).  The best example is Teague v. Lane, which severely 
limits the claims that are cognizable in federal collateral proceedings without 
reference to any statutory provision even vaguely in point.  489 U.S. 288 (1989).  In 
Danforth v. Minnesota, the Court nonetheless explained that “Teague is based on 
statutory authority.”  552 U.S. 264, 278–79 (2008). 
 32. E.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993) (explaining that it was 
necessary to create a rule for harmless error to be applied in habeas cases because 
Congress had established none by statute); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516–17 
(1982) (justifying a rule for cases in which prisoners file petitions containing some 
claims that are ready for federal adjudication and some claims that are not on the 
ground that Congress had not anticipated the problem).   
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disadvantage.33  The common explanation is the dubious notion that 
Congress generally meant AEDPA “to reduce delays in the execution 
of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases.”34  
Yet the Court’s decisions do not always favor the state, but, by 
contrast, sometimes preserve and protect previous arrangements that 
benefit habeas petitioners.35  The task is to arrive at sensible 
interpretations the text can bear, but does not necessarily command.36 
The meaning ascribed to particular provisions must coordinate 
Chapter 154 with the larger habeas universe of which it is a part.  No 
one supposes that Chapter 154 creates an entirely different, 
complete, self-contained set of arrangements for death penalty cases 
from covered states, which eclipses all other aspects of federal habeas 
law by negative implication.37  Congress did not enact Chapter 154 in 
isolation, but alongside numerous amendments to Chapter 153 and 
against the backdrop of the Court’s body of habeas precedents, as 
well as the Powell Committee’s recommendations.  Cases subject to 
Chapter 154 are also governed by Chapter 153,38 and, in at least some 
respects, the Court’s own judgments about habeas practice survive 
even if AEDPA fails to incorporate them explicitly.39 
Squaring Chapter 154 with the rest of the habeas world would be a 
difficult assignment if that world had stood still these last twenty 
years.  It has not.  We have seen that the USA PATRIOT Act shifted 
responsibility for assessing state counsel systems to the Attorney 
                                                          
 33. E.g., (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000).   
 34. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003).  But see Lee Kovarsky, 
AEDPA’s Wrecks:  Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 445 (2007) 
(challenging the idea that Congress consistently advanced any particular objectives); 
cf. Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology:  The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal 
Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67, 84–87 (2005) (contending that the justices have voted 
along ideological lines in AEDPA cases). 
 35. E.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) (concluding that the 
limitation period AEDPA establishes for habeas petitions admits of a previously 
recognized exception for cases in which prisoners present proof of actual 
innocence); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943–44 (2007) (retaining the pre-
Act definition of “second or successive” petitions). 
 36. I do not mean to engage the jurisprudential debate over interpretive 
methodology generally, but only to argue that in this context courts should choose 
workable interpretations when a statutory text permits same.   
 37. But cf. RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE 125 n.35 (6th ed. 2011) (floating the argument that since Chapter 
154 applies to “cases arising under section 2254” its provisions supplement only those 
aspects of habeas law that are established by § 2254 and “substitute” for habeas rules 
and procedures ascribable to other elements of Chapter 153). 
 38. In Lindh v. Murphy, the Court recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 2264 “is explicit in 
applying” some provisions in Chapter 153 to capital cases controlled by Chapter 154, 
and described provisions in Chapter 153 as “applying to habeas cases generally, 
including cases under chapter 154.”  521 U.S. 320, 332, 334 (1997). 
 39. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931–32 (making this point in the case of the 
judicially fashioned “miscarriage of justice” exception to procedural bar rules). 
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General.40  That Act also made changes in the Chapter 153 provision 
on stays of execution and adjusted the timetables for federal court 
action on applications for habeas relief in death penalty cases subject 
to Chapter 154.41  Most important, in an astonishing number of full-
dress opinions, the Supreme Court has elaborated both on its own 
habeas doctrines and on the amendments AEDPA made to Chapter 153. 
Tracing the influence of the Powell Committee presents a unique 
challenge.  There is no gainsaying that the Committee provided the 
general model for Chapter 154, nor that many provisions in the 
statute plainly stem from analog elements of the Committee’s plan.  
It will often make perfect sense, accordingly, to interpret Chapter 154 
provisions to effectuate the Committee’s recommendations.  Recall, 
however, that the Committee assumed that habeas law would remain 
as it was in 1989 save for the changes its own proposals would make.42  
The Committee did not reckon with the amendments to Chapter 153 
that would be adopted along with Chapter 154, far less the changes 
the PATRIOT Act would make later.  Nor could the Committee 
foresee the course and implications of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in habeas cases.43 
We will see that, in some respects, Chapter 154 refashions the 
Committee’s plan to correspond to changes in Chapter 153 and the 
march of decisional habeas law.  In some instances, moreover, there 
are differences between the Powell Committee’s stated objectives and 
the text of its own recommendations.  Indeed, the Committee was at 
times surprisingly dense in failing to see that the terms of a 
recommendation, if taken literally, would actually frustrate its goals.44  
There, too, Chapter 154 can and should be read to embrace more 
serviceable alternatives.  At all events, when provisions in Chapter 154 
depart from the Powell Committee, the reasons are not self-evident.  
It may be that Chapter 154 rejects the Committee’s guidance in whole 
or in part, but that inference is not compelled.  Different terms may be 
the product of drafting protocols, clumsy efforts to polish, oversight, 
ignorance, or (so often with respect to AEDPA) plain bad grammar. 
                                                          
 40. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 41. See infra text accompanying notes 51, 237. 
 42. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 43. The surprising development of the Teague doctrine is a prime illustration.  
The progenitor decision, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), was handed down on 
February 22, 1989.  The Committee Report was dated August 23, 1989, and obviously 
had been formulated over the preceding months.  The Committee could not have 
digested the Court’s decision, far less anticipated what the Teague doctrine would 
grow to be in the years ahead. 
 44. See infra text accompanying notes 113–15.  
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The interpretations I offer in this article are not ineluctable.  
Some, indeed, may seem improbable at first glance.  But they are 
defensible as plausible readings of the text.  To appraise them, one 
must ask whether they are any less so than the competing alternatives.  
We are not obliged to make the worst of this law when there are 
justifiable ways to make the best of it. 
III. THE PARTICULARS OF CHAPTER 154 
A. Stays of Execution 
Chapter 154 addresses stays of execution in 28 U.S.C. § 2262.  
Once counsel is appointed to represent a prisoner in state 
postconviction proceedings, § 2262(a) mandates that the prisoner’s 
execution “shall be stayed upon application to any court that would 
have jurisdiction” to entertain a federal habeas petition.  Under 
§ 2262(b), a stay “granted pursuant to [§ 2262(a)]” expires under any 
of three conditions:  the prisoner fails to file a timely petition for 
federal habeas relief; the prisoner forgoes the opportunity to seek 
habeas relief; or the prisoner files a seasonable petition, but either 
“fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a Federal right or 
is denied relief in the district court or at any subsequent stage of 
review.”  If “one of [these] conditions . . . has occurred,” § 2262(c) 
specifies that “no Federal court thereafter shall have the authority to 
enter a stay of execution in the case, unless the court of appeals 
approves the filing of a second or successive application under 
section 2244(b).” 
Section 2262 should be interpreted to implement the best of the 
Powell Committee’s ideas—namely, the elimination of stressful 
litigation over stays.45  A troubling pattern had developed.  State 
authorities scheduled executions before prisoners had begun, far less 
completed, efforts to upset their convictions or sentences in 
postconviction proceedings.  Prisoners responded with motions for 
stays in state court, federal court, or both.  State authorities resisted.  
And everyone was consumed with and by emergency proceedings that 
sometimes stretched into the eleventh hour.  The judges on the 
Committee had no taste for late-night sessions conducted over the 
telephone with the lives of petitioners in the balance. 
None of this wear and tear on the parties and the courts was 
necessary.  According to the Committee, prisoners, for their part, 
were content to postpone legal action that might fail and clear the 
                                                          
 45. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,695. 
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way for their execution.46  State authorities, for theirs, set execution 
dates primarily to prod reluctant prisoners into action.47  The 
Committee’s answer was to encourage prisoners to pursue 
postconviction relief via the 180-day filing period for initiating federal 
habeas proceedings.48  State authorities then would be less inclined to 
fix early execution dates.  If they did so anyway, the Committee 
proposed that a stay should be “a matter of right,” albeit a stay should 
expire if the prisoner suffered a denial of relief after the “completion 
of district court and court of appeals review,” as well as any 
subsequent Supreme Court proceedings.49 
The Committee recommended that an additional mandatory stay 
should be available only in cases of a certain kind—specifically, cases 
in which state authorities unlawfully prevented prisoners from 
presenting claims earlier and cases in which prisoners advanced 
claims based on new rules of law applicable in habeas actions or 
claims supported by a “factual predicate that could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence” and was 
“sufficient . . . to undermine the court’s confidence in the jury’s 
determination of guilt on the offence . . . for which the death penalty 
was imposed.”50  In this, the Committee’s proposal was similar to the text 
Congress would later enact as § 2244(b) to govern all second or successive 
habeas petitions and would incorporate by reference in § 2262. 
A proper interpretation of § 2262 must account for related 
elements of habeas law with which this new provision coexists.  For 
our purposes, a brief summary will suffice.  The provision that § 2262 
explicitly incorporates, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), is an AEDPA 
amendment to Chapter 153, ostensibly meant to confine second or 
successive habeas petitions to the most deserving cases, both capital 
and noncapital.  Under § 2244(b)(3)(A), a prisoner who wishes to 
file such a petition at the district level must first obtain leave from the 
appropriate circuit court of appeals.  Under § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B), a 
second or successive application can be considered only if the 
prisoner advances a claim based on a “new rule of constitutional law” 
that is enforceable in federal collateral proceedings or a claim 
grounded in a “factual predicate” that “could not have been 
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence” and is 
“sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 
                                                          
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 24,694.  
 48. Id. at 24,695. 
 49. Id. at 24,697.   
 50. Id. 
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constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the 
applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 
 A general provision on stays in Chapter 153, 28 U.S.C. § 2251, 
grants federal courts discretion to stay state proceedings against a 
prisoner to ensure that federal adjudication can proceed.  In 2005, 
the USA PATRIOT Act revised § 2251, while leaving § 2262 
untouched.51  Section 2251(a)(1) authorizes a federal judge before 
whom a habeas corpus proceeding is “pending” to stay any state 
action against the prisoner.  Section 2251(a)(2) specifies that a 
“habeas corpus proceeding is not pending until the application [for 
habeas relief] is filed.”  Yet recognizing that a prisoner under 
sentence of death needs a stay to allow time to develop a petition, 
§ 2251(a)(3) authorizes a court “that would have jurisdiction” to 
entertain a habeas application to issue a stay of execution as soon as 
the prisoner asks for assigned counsel.  Section 2251 fixes no 
standard to guide the court’s discretion, but the Supreme Court has 
held that a stay should usually be granted if necessary to examine a 
prisoner’s first petition and that a stay can be granted for purposes of 
a second or successive application when there are “substantial 
grounds for relief.”52  A discretionary pre-petition stay can extend no 
longer than ninety days after counsel is appointed.  A prisoner who 
obtains a ninety-day stay under § 2251(a)(3) may seek another stay at 
the end of that time, provided that, by then, he or she has filed a 
habeas petition that initiates a “pending” proceeding and thus 
engages the separate authorization for stays established by 
§ 2251(a)(1). 
1.  Mandatory stays 
Section 2262 in Chapter 154 supplements § 2251 in Chapter 153 by 
making stays in death penalty cases mandatory rather than 
discretionary.  This is in keeping with the Powell Committee’s plan 
largely to defuse litigation over stays while death-sentenced prisoners 
pursue postconviction relief.53  As soon as Chapter 154 is brought 
into play by the appointment of counsel, § 2262(a) directs that an 
execution “shall be stayed” upon the prisoner’s application to any court 
that “would have jurisdiction” to entertain a federal habeas petition.54 
The provisions in § 2262(b) for the expiration of a mandatory stay 
also track the Powell Committee program, which equally 
                                                          
 51. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 52. Bowersox v. Williams, 517 U.S. 345, 346 (1996) (per curiam) (dealing with a 
second or successive petition); Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 325 (1996).   
 53. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,695. 
 54. See infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text (discussing the link between 
the appointment of counsel and the 180-day filing period for a habeas application 
identifying the prisoner’s claims).   
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contemplated that a stay should terminate if the prisoner fails to file a 
timely habeas petition, waives the chance to pursue a postconviction 
challenge, or suffers a denial of relief.55  The language § 2262(b)(3) 
employs to describe this last condition departs from the text of the 
Powell Committee’s proposal, which spelled out in detail that a 
mandatory stay holds through the normal appellate process.56  Recall 
that § 2262(b)(3) specifies the denial of relief “in the district court or 
at any subsequent stage of review.”  But it would be nonsense to 
conclude that a mandatory stay disappears as soon as an inferior 
federal court reaches an unfavorable decision. 
In the postconviction context, the judgment of a district or circuit 
court is not conventionally final until it is sustained on direct review 
or the time for seeking review has expired.57  The general federal 
statutes governing the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and the 
Supreme Court contemplate that a district court decision is open to 
reexamination on appeal in the ordinary course.58  Section 
2262(b)(3) obviously does not repeal those statutes expressly and 
cannot do so implicitly by negative inference.59  Moreover, an attempt 
to insulate a district court judgment from appellate superintendence 
would evoke constitutional objections—including, but not limited to, 
Congress’ authority to restrict the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction 
established by Article III.60 
It is far more satisfying to read § 2262(b)(3) as an attempt to state 
the Powell Committee’s program more economically—that is, to 
mean that a mandatory stay expires if and when relief is denied by 
final action up the federal ladder.  The idea is not that a mandatory 
stay expires the moment a district court denies relief and that 
appellate review is foreclosed or irrelevant.  It is that a mandatory stay 
dissolves when a denial of relief by any federal court in the hierarchy 
becomes final and thus authoritative, either by operation of law when 
no appellate review is sought or by ultimate decision in the Supreme 
Court.  This understanding fully accounts for the disjunctive “or” in 
                                                          
 55. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,697. 
 56. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 57. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003); see infra note 189 and 
accompanying text (discussing the same understanding of final state court judgments). 
 58. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1291 (2012). 
 59. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001) 
(applying this general rule in the habeas context). 
 60. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 661–62 (1996) (construing a limitation on 
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to leave original jurisdiction in place and thus 
avoiding any question under Article III); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and 
the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1505 
(2000) (arguing that the “inferior” character of federal courts necessarily 
contemplates supervisory authority in the Supreme Court).  
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the text.  A stay can expire on the strength of a denial of relief by a 
district court or another court further up the line, but only when the 
relevant decision becomes final. 
In one respect, § 2262(b)(3) adds a condition the Powell 
Committee did not recommend—namely, a stay of execution expires 
if a docketed habeas petition “fails to make a substantial showing of 
the denial of a Federal right.”  This “substantial showing” formulation 
should be interpreted to contemplate only the modest requirement 
that the petition contain a non-frivolous claim.  If a “substantial 
showing” were read to demand more, federal courts would 
necessarily have to entertain litigation over its proper application, if 
and when state authorities complain.  That, in turn, would be 
inconsistent with the essential point of § 2262 to avoid distracting 
fights over stays.61 
It would be untenable to read the “substantial showing” 
formulation as it is used in § 2262(b)(3) to have the same meaning it 
has been given elsewhere—for example, in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), 
where it describes the standard a prisoner must meet to appeal from 
a negative district court judgment.62  The “substantial showing” test has 
never been a good fit in that context.  On its face, it suggests that a 
prisoner must establish that his or her claim is meritorious when, by 
hypothesis, the district court has already found it wanting.  The Court has 
forced it to fit, however, by holding that a prisoner makes the necessary 
“substantial showing” if “reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . 
the petition should have been resolved in a different manner.”63   
The appearance in § 2262(b)(3) of language that also appears in 
§ 2253(c)(2) is best understood as either the unknowing use of a 
phrase that has acquired special meaning in another context or a 
mistake born of the drafters’ failure to distinguish two quite different 
situations.  Here, the business at hand is not to determine whether it 
is worthwhile for a circuit court to review a district court judgment for 
                                                          
 61. Any conditions on the continuation of a stay obviously undercut the Powell 
Committee’s objective to eliminate litigation over stays.  The 180-day rule, for 
example, can be enforced in its own right.  It was neither necessary nor prudent to 
make the timeliness of a petition a condition for the continuation of a stay of 
execution, thus making a motion to rescind a stay the occasion for adjudicating 
filing-period issues by proxy.  Then again, if the 180-day rule induces prisoners to 
apply for federal habeas relief as soon as possible, the states will have no reason to set 
execution dates and stays will be unnecessary—which, again, was the Committee’s plan. 
 62. The only textual difference is that § 2253(c)(2) demands a substantial 
showing of the denial of a “constitutional” rather than a “Federal” right.  The 
Supreme Court has finessed the limit of appeals to substantial constitutional issues.  
See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (permitting appellate consideration 
of substantial contentions regarding nonconstitutional habeas law). 
 63. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 475). 
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error.  The task is to determine whether a petition has enough 
potential merit to warrant consideration by a district court in the first 
instance, thus to justify extending a stay of execution.  Any door-
keeping standard at this stage must be low.  Otherwise, the working 
premise would again be put at risk—that is, the premise that a 
prisoner should have one opportunity to pursue state and federal 
relief without the distractions and costs of litigation over a stay of 
execution necessary to make it possible.  The precedents treating 
discretionary stays issued under § 2251 identify no standard at all and, 
at most, require only a colorable claim.64  If litigation over stays is to 
be avoided in capital cases subject to Chapter 154, the “substantial 
showing” standard in § 2262(b)(3) can be no more demanding and, 
indeed, should be less.65 
Reading § 2262(b)(3) to require only the assertion of a non-
frivolous claim comports with the pleading rules for habeas corpus 
petitions generally, including applications subject to Chapter 154.  
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases instructs a district court 
to dismiss an initial petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition 
and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to 
relief.”66  The Supreme Court has explained that a petition may be 
dismissed summarily only if the allegations are “vague,” or 
“conclusory,” or “palpably incredible,” or “patently frivolous or 
false.”67  If a petition clears this modest hurdle, the court must order 
                                                          
 64. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 860 (1994) (O’Connor, J., dissenting in 
part).  The test for determining whether a complaint is sufficient to invoke federal-
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is also famously generous.  See Bell v. 
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946) (explaining that jurisdiction is sustained unless 
the federal issue is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous”). 
 65. The Court held in Martinez v. Ryan, that a prisoner’s procedural default in 
state court may be excused on the ground that counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance in state postconviction proceedings if, inter alia, the claim that counsel was 
ineffective is “substantial.”  132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320–21 (2012).  The Court explained 
that a claim is “substantial” in that context if it has “some merit.”  Id.  Recognizing, 
perhaps, that the “substantial” term brings to mind the test for approving an appeal, 
the Court cited Miller-El as “cf.” authority, thus signaling that “substantial” does not 
necessarily have the same meaning in both places.  See also id. at 1322 n.2 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (reading the Court to say that a claim is “substantial” in default cases if it 
has “at least some merit”). 
 66. The reference in Rule 4 to a prisoner’s entitlement to “relief” opens the 
argument that Rule 4, too, like the Court’s interpretation of the “substantial 
showing” phrase in § 2253(c)(2), requires consideration of whether some habeas 
corpus statute might bar federal habeas relief even with respect to a claim the federal 
court regards as meritorious.  Yet when Rule 4 and § 2253 were originally adopted, a 
meritorious claim and an entitlement to relief were synonymous.  It is only recently 
that the Court has expanded the idea of an entitlement to relief to cover compliance 
with statutes that sometimes limit a federal court’s authority to order a prisoner’s 
release despite the merits of a claim. 
 67. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75–76 (1977). 
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the respondent to file an answer, which then joins the issues for 
adjudication.  Together, § 2262 and Rule 4 establish a workable 
scheme:  A prisoner who wishes to challenge a conviction or death 
sentence is entitled to a stay of execution on request.  If the prisoner 
then files a timely petition sufficient to avoid summary dismissal, the 
stay will persist through all stages of the litigation to follow. 
2.  Multiple stays 
Section 2262(c) provides that, if any of the conditions in § 2262(b) 
occurs, “no Federal court thereafter shall have the authority to enter 
a stay of execution in the case, unless the court of appeals approves 
the filing of a second or successive application under section 
2244(b).”68  This provision, too, follows the Powell Committee.69  If a 
mandatory stay has just expired, it would scarcely make sense that a 
federal court should immediately be required to issue another one in 
its place, no questions asked.  Then again, it makes a great deal of 
sense that a further stay should be available in some circumstances.  
Section 2262(c) can and should be read to allow for same. 
Initially, the general prohibition on further stays should be read to 
apply only to additional mandatory stays issued under the authority of 
§ 2262(a)—not to stays issued in the court’s discretion under 
§ 2251.70  The text of § 2262(c) is general, referring loosely to “a stay 
of execution in the case.”  Yet the context is specific.  Section 2262(c) 
appears in a provision of Chapter 154 dealing with mandatory stays 
and specifies the full consequences when a mandatory stay expires 
under § 2262(b)—namely, the prisoner is no longer entitled to a stay 
on simple application to a federal court.  Nothing in § 2262(c) 
expressly disclaims a federal court’s independent authority under 
§ 2251.  One can read § 2262(c) to affect that authority only by 
drawing an unnecessary negative inference.  It is far more sensible to 
interpret all the elements of § 2262, including § 2262(c), to deal with 
the Powell Committee’s plan for mandatory stays.  It follows that a 
prisoner whose § 2262(a) mandatory stay expires may obtain a later 
§ 2251 stay, provided the court deems it warranted. 
                                                          
 68. It should be noncontroversial that § 2262(c) has only to do with a case in 
which a stay previously issued as a matter of right has expired under one of the 
conditions listed in § 2262(b), which explicitly deals only with a mandatory stay 
“granted pursuant to [§ 2262(a)].”  Section 2262(c) has nothing to say about a case 
in which a prisoner previously secured a stay that was authorized (but not required) 
under § 2251. 
 69. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,697. 
 70. See supra text accompanying notes 51–52.  
YACKLE.OFF.TO.PRINTERYACKLE.FINAL TECH(DO NOT DELETE) 9/12/2014  4:42 PM 
2014] THE NEW HABEAS CORPUS IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 1807 
Section 2262(c) should be interpreted to make another stay 
mandatory when a prisoner advances a second or successive 
application.  The text is explicit on this point.  When one mandatory 
stay expires pursuant to § 2262(b), a future stay is barred unless the 
petitioner obtains circuit court approval for a second or successive 
habeas petition under § 2244(b).  Put the other way, another stay can 
issue if the prisoner does secure approval for a second or successive 
application.71  Because leave to file such a petition is an exception to 
the rule governing mandatory stays, the fair inference is that a stay 
made possible by the exception is itself a matter of right.  To 
interpret the exception to allow only for a discretionary stay would 
again be to read § 2262(b) to affect the court’s authority under 
§ 2251—without textual support. 
This last interpretation is consistent with the Powell Committee 
model on which § 2262 is based.  True, the Committee envisioned 
one meaningful opportunity for postconviction review and 
discouraged multiple applications for federal relief.72  Yet the 
Committee expressly approved a “mandatory” stay for subsequent 
proceedings, provided a prisoner satisfies standards similar to the 
conditions for a second or successive petition under § 2244(b).73 
It would be infeasible to withhold a stay until a prisoner actually 
goes to a circuit court and returns with leave to file a second or 
successive application.  Section 2262(c) should therefore be read to 
mandate a stay from the district court while a prisoner seeks 
permission from a circuit court.  The resulting arrangement is 
cumbersome, but no more arduous when Chapter 154 is in play than 
in the run of habeas cases.  In most instances, the circuit court will 
deny the prisoner’s request to file another petition, and the stay will 
dissolve at that point.  If, however, the prisoner is allowed to press a 
second or successive application, the stay should cover those proceedings 
through to final resolution at the appellate level.  Of course, a prisoner 
seeking approval for a second or successive application also may seek 
and secure a stay of execution under § 2251, either after such a 
petition is filed or before, pursuant to § 2251(a)(3).74 
 
                                                          
 71. A prisoner’s first request for a mandatory stay under § 2262(a) need not be 
for purposes of a first application for habeas relief.  A prisoner who is not threatened 
with immediate execution when he or she is considering an initial federal petition 
needs no stay at that time, but may face execution later and thus may request a stay 
for the first time in connection with a second or successive petition. 
 72. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,697. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.  
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In the end, § 2262 in Chapter 154 combines with § 2251 in Chapter 
153 to establish a coherent scheme for stays of execution in capital 
cases.  Under § 2262, a pre-petition stay is guaranteed and typically 
remains operative until the conclusion of federal litigation at all 
levels.  A mandatory stay expires if the prisoner fails to file a timely, 
non-frivolous habeas petition or suffers a final denial of habeas relief.  
Thereafter, the prisoner is generally no longer entitled to a stay as a 
matter of right.  There is an exception, however, if the prisoner seeks 
leave to advance a second or successive federal petition under 
§ 2244(b).  If the prisoner obtains permission, the mandatory stay 
remains in place while any further habeas action is adjudicated.  A 
prisoner under sentence of death may also secure a stay of execution 
issued under the authority of § 2251.  A discretionary stay does not 
expire by operation of law when one of the conditions in § 2262(b) 
occurs.  Nor is a court’s authority to grant multiple discretionary stays 
affected by the general language in § 2262(c). 
This understanding is consistent with the text Congress wrote into 
law—both, in 1996, when AEDPA introduced § 2262 and § 2244(b), 
and, in 2005, when the USA PATRIOT Act reworked § 2251 
regarding discretionary stays.  The resulting scheme is needlessly 
complicated, to be sure.  The relevant statutes were written at 
different times by different sets of drafters who failed to appreciate 
fully either the need for stays of execution at the various stages of 
capital cases or the time and resources that can be wasted in fights 
over stays rather than the merits of petitioners’ claims.  Yet, 
interpreted this way, the statutes governing stays promise to work, 
thus to implement the Powell Committee’s attractive vision.  When 
Chapter 154 comes into play, the days of costly, agonizing litigation 
over stays of execution should be over. 
B.  Amendments 
Chapter 154 provides, in 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(3)(B), that “[n]o 
amendment to an application for a writ of habeas corpus under this 
chapter shall be permitted after the filing of the answer to the 
application, except on the grounds specified in section 2244(b).”  
This provision has no antecedents in the Powell Committee.  The 
challenge, then, is to determine the most satisfying way to fit 
§ 2266(b)(3)(B) into the law governing amendments in habeas 
corpus cases generally.   
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Again, a summary will do.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 2242, a longstanding 
component of habeas law not amended by AEDPA, habeas petitions 
“may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of 
procedure applicable to civil actions.”  Rule 15(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that pleadings may be amended 
“once as a matter of course” within twenty-one days of service or, if a 
responsive pleading is required, within twenty-one days after the response 
or service of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12.  Thereafter, amendments 
require consent or leave of court.  Amendments relate back to the date 
of the original pleading, provided the original and amended pleadings 
arose out of “the [same] conduct, transaction, or occurrence. . . .”75 
Nothing in § 2266(b)(3)(B) purports to change the arrangements 
for amendments prior to the respondent’s answer.  But with respect 
to later amendments, this provision, like § 2262(c) on stays of execution, 
borrows from § 2244(b), the provision in Chapter 153 pertaining to 
second or successive applications for federal habeas relief.76 
It is not obvious what we should make of § 2266(b)(3)(B).  Its 
location among timetables for federal action may be probative.77  It 
may be that this provision reinforces the 180-day filing period for 
capital habeas petitions.  Amendments can effectively extend the 
clock if they are accepted after the filing period has run and relate 
back to the date of the original petition.  The AEDPA drafters may 
have worried that prisoners would smuggle tardy allegations into 
amendments after the clock has expired.78  In 1996, concerns along 
those lines may have appeared realistic because, by some accounts, 
the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” to which an amendment 
related back was the entirety of the state criminal prosecution that 
produced a prisoner’s conviction and sentence.79  Virtually any 
allegation challenging the conviction or sentence would arise from 
an event defined so broadly. 
In this instance, however, as in so many others, subsequent 
developments have largely eliminated any threat to the habeas filing 
period.  The Supreme Court has held that an amendment to a habeas 
                                                          
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B). 
 76. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
 77. See infra notes 235–38 and accompanying text (treating other aspects of § 2266). 
 78. The (unsuccessful) Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005 included a proposed 
change in the rules governing amendments.  Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement Act of 
2005 and the Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005:  Hearings on H.R. 3060 and H.R. 3035 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 28, 54, 63, 65–66 (2005).  The hearings suggested that proponents were 
concerned that amendments would defeat the filing period for habeas cases 
generally.  By then, however, this provision in AEDPA was already in place. 
 79. E.g., Ellzey v. United States, 324 F.3d 521, 525–27 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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petition arises from the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” 
only if the claim contained in the amendment is grounded in the 
“same core facts” as the claims in the original petition.80  Section 
2266(b)(3)(B) is redundant if it incorporates the standards 
governing second or successive petitions to head off unseasonable 
habeas claims.  Stiff standards governing amendments are no longer 
needed now that most amendments would not relate back even if 
they were accepted. 
The choice of the standards in § 2244(b) is curious.  By their 
nature, amendments do not entail additional suits and all the 
inefficiencies and delays that attend piecemeal litigation.  Those are 
the problems that explain the stringent criteria for second or 
successive petitions.  Amendments, by contrast, make the best of an 
initial application for federal relief.  Barring most amendments at the 
post-answer stage only forces prisoners to resort to second or 
successive petitions, which then add to and prolong litigation in 
capital cases subject to Chapter 154.81 
It is manifest that § 2266(b)(3)(B) does (unwisely) introduce the 
standards for second or successive petitions into the amendment 
context.  But we need not live with the complex mechanics entailed 
in the operation of § 2244(b) in its own precincts.  There, a prisoner 
who wishes to advance a new claim in a second or successive petition 
must first obtain permission from the court of appeals.  By contrast to 
§ 2262(a) on stays of execution (which contemplates action in the 
court of appeals), § 2266(b)(3)(B) refers only to the “grounds 
specified in section 2244(b).”  Accordingly, § 2266(b)(3)(B) can and 
should be read to authorize a district court entertaining an 
amendment motion itself to apply the standards for second or 
successive applications.  This interpretation makes sense, albeit within 
a questionable larger plan for amendments.  The language in 
§ 2266(b)(3)(B) may restrict the reasons a district court can accept 
for an amendment post-answer, but it need not be read to funnel the 




                                                          
 80. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 657 (2005).  
 81. Claims that can be advanced in amendments under § 2266(b)(3)(B) because 
they meet one of the standards in § 2244(b) are likely to rest on new factual 
allegations and thus will not have the benefit of the relation-back feature in Rule 15.  
This being so, counseled and knowledgeable petitioners are unlikely to offer such 
claims via amendments for the purpose of meeting the filing deadline.   
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The restriction on amendments in § 2266(b)(3)(B), however 
inscrutable, does count as a state-friendly element of Chapter 154 
that is absent from habeas litigation generally.  Prisoners under 
sentence of death in covered jurisdictions will be pressed to sharpen 
their allegations before the respondent answers.  States hoping to 
elude federal claims on procedural grounds may regard this as a 
reason for obtaining certification. 
C.  The Scope of Federal Adjudication 
The only provision in Chapter 154 addressing the substance of 
federal court adjudication is 28 U.S.C. § 2264.  Section 2264(a) states 
that a federal district court entertaining a petition “shall only 
consider” a claim that was “raised and decided on the merits” in state 
court, “unless the failure to raise the claim properly” was:  (1) “the 
result of State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States;” (2) “the result of the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
a new Federal right that is made retroactively applicable;” or (3) 
“based on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of due diligence in time to present the claim for 
State or Federal post-conviction review.”82  Section 2264(b) states that 
“[f]ollowing review subject to subsections (a), (d), and (e) of section 
2254, the court shall rule on the claims properly before it.”83 
We will see that § 2264 is best understood to address cases in which 
death row prisoners present claims the state courts refuse to entertain 
because of procedural default in state court.  On this occasion, the 
AEDPA drafters substantially rejected a key recommendation of the 
Powell Committee.  In the Committee’s view, death penalty litigation 
was too often delayed because federal habeas courts postponed 
federal adjudication until prisoners first exhausted their remedies in 
state court.84  The Committee recommended that, in some 
circumstances, a federal court entertaining a capital habeas case from 
a covered jurisdiction should not wait for a claim to be presented to 
the state courts, but should promptly conduct any hearing necessary 
to complete the record and then should itself determine the merits. 
Section 2264 should be read to contemplate that state courts will 
continue to have the first opportunity to examine federal claims.  
This interpretation reconciles § 2264 with settled habeas rules and 
procedures like the exhaustion doctrine and also with innovations in 
                                                          
 82. See infra notes 144–53 and accompanying text. 
 83. See infra text accompanying notes 122, 171. 
 84. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,694. 
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general habeas law introduced by AEDPA’s amendments to Chapter 
153—as they have developed since by dint of Supreme Court 
decisions.  The Powell Committee recommendation would have 
changed habeas practice significantly, albeit not, in this instance, 
always to favor the state in habeas litigation.  The statute Congress 
enacted is largely favorable to the state, but, once again, in ways that 
equally protect state interests in cases not subject to Chapter 154.   
Here, too, a summary of relevant arrangements is necessary.  
Under longstanding precedents and a codification of those 
precedents in 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c),85 a prisoner seeking 
federal habeas relief must first exhaust state court opportunities to 
vindicate a federal claim.86  If, at the time a petition for federal 
habeas relief is filed, the state concerned offers an effective means of 
adjudicating a claim, a federal district court will typically dismiss the 
claim without prejudice to another federal petition presenting the 
claim after state remedies have been exhausted.87  The prisoner’s 
responsibility is to give the state courts an opportunity to pass on the 
claim; whether the state courts address the claim is their own affair.88  
If a filing period will expire before the prisoner can return to federal 
court, the federal court may hold federal proceedings in abeyance 
while the prisoner litigates a claim in state court—provided the 
prisoner shows “cause” for failing to exhaust state remedies with 
respect to all claims in the first instance.89 
 Pursuant to the “total exhaustion” rule established by the Supreme 
Court, if a prisoner files a federal petition containing both a claim 
previously presented to the state courts and a claim the state courts 
have had no chance to address, the federal court will decline to 
consider either claim.90  The prisoner may withdraw both claims, take 
the premature claim to state court, and return to federal court when 
both claims are ready for federal consideration.91  Or the prisoner 
may secure prompt federal adjudication of the mature claim by 
deleting only the premature claim.  If the prisoner follows this 
                                                          
 85. See H.R. REP. NO. 80-808, at A180 (1947) (stating that these provisions were 
“declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme Court”). 
 86. See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26–27 (1939) (explaining that the 
exhaustion doctrine “is not one defining power but one which relates to the 
appropriate exercise of power”). 
 87. See Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53, 54 (1971) (per curiam) (explaining that 
dismissal is usually the appropriate disposition). 
 88. See Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332, 333–34 (1978) (per curiam) (explaining 
that it makes no difference whether the state courts addressed a claim). 
 89. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–78 (2005) (explaining that it would be 
an abuse of discretion to deny a stay in these circumstances). 
 90. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) (holding that a “mixed” petition 
should be dismissed in its entirety). 
 91. See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 154 (2007) (per curiam). 
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second course, exhausts state remedies with respect to the deleted 
claim, and later advances that claim in another application for federal 
relief, that petition can be entertained only under the conditions 
specified in § 2244(b) for second or successive applications.92 
 Under precedents never codified, a prisoner’s claim may be 
foreclosed in federal habeas because of procedural default in state 
court.93  State courts may decline to entertain a federal claim if the 
prisoner failed to raise it at the time and in the manner prescribed by 
state law.  Out of respect for state arrangements, a federal habeas 
court will also turn the prisoner away—provided the basis of the state 
court decision constitutes an adequate and independent state 
ground that would insulate the state judgment from Supreme Court 
jurisdiction if the case were before the Court on direct review.94  If 
the state law basis of decision is adequate and independent, the 
federal claim is foreclosed—unless the prisoner shows “cause” for the 
procedural default in state court and resulting “prejudice,” or the 
prisoner brings his or her case within a “miscarriage of justice” 
exception by making a “credible showing of actual innocence.”95 
 For these purposes, a prisoner demonstrates “cause” if, at the time 
a claim might have been raised in state court its factual or legal basis 
was not “reasonably available,” if state authorities made counsel’s 
compliance with state procedures “impracticable,” or if counsel’s 
failure to comply constituted ineffective assistance (usually) in the 
constitutional sense.96  Proof of “prejudice” overlaps with the 
elements of a meritorious claim inasmuch as “prejudice” is shown if 
the federal error that went uncorrected in state court “so infected the 
entire trial that the resulting conviction” was unfair.97  A prisoner 
who challenges his or her conviction invokes the “miscarriage of 
justice” exception by presenting new evidence demonstrating that it 
is “more likely than not that no reasonable juror” who saw the 
evidence “would have” voted to convict.98  A prisoner who attacks 
only a death sentence does so by presenting “clear and convincing” 
evidence showing that “but for a constitutional error,” no 
“reasonable juror” would have found the petitioner eligible for the 
death penalty.99 
                                                          
 92. Id.(confirming a suggestion in Lundy). 
 93. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89–91 (1977). 
 94. Id. at 81–83; see Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60 (2009) (reaffirming this point).   
 95. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (amplifying the 
“miscarriage of justice” exception); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) 
(articulating these categories). 
 96. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.  
 97. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982); see Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 
668, 691 (2004) (acknowledging the convergence of “prejudice” and the 
demonstration of a meritorious claim). 
 98. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 327 (1995). 
 99. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 348 (1992). 
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 The Supreme Court has read 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a provision in 
Chapter 153 amended by AEDPA, to mean that if a state court 
rejected a federal claim on the merits, a federal habeas court typically 
cannot hold its own evidentiary hearing, but must examine the claim 
on the basis of the record as it was in state court and cannot grant 
relief unless (roughly speaking) the state decision was not only 
incorrect, but also unreasonable.100  The Court itself must defer to a 
“reasonable” state court merits decision when the Court entertains a 
case in a habeas posture.101  For purposes of § 2254(d), a state court 
adjudicated a claim on the merits if the court rejected the claim 
“based on the intrinsic right and wrong of the matter.”102  If the state 
court simply overlooked the claim, § 2254(d) is inapplicable, and the 
federal court will examine the claim de novo.103 
 Finally, the Court has held that under another AEDPA amendment 
to Chapter 153, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), a federal court must “presume” 
that factual determinations reached by state courts are correct and is 
usually barred from holding an evidentiary hearing if the prisoner 
failed to develop the facts in state court.104  A prisoner is responsible 
for inadequate fact development in state court unless the prisoner 
demonstrates that he or she diligently attempted to bring the facts to 
light but was prevented from doing so.105 
1.  The exhaustion doctrine generally 
The Powell Committee proposed that a district court should 
“determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary record . . . based on the 
claims actually presented and litigated in the state courts except when 
the prisoner [could] show that the failure to raise or develop a claim 
in the state courts” fit one of the three exceptions the AEDPA 
drafters later inserted in § 2264(a).106  The Committee specified that 
the federal court would “conduct any requested evidentiary hearing 
necessary to complete the record” and then “rule on the merits of the 
claims properly before it.”107 
                                                          
 100. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (reading § 2254(d) alone 
largely to foreclose federal evidentiary hearings); (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 411 (2000) (explaining that a state decision the federal court regards as 
erroneous may nonetheless bar federal habeas relief).   
 101. See Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 148–49 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(explaining that a result favorable to a petitioner might have been warranted if the 
case had come up on direct review).   
 102. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1097 (2013). 
 103. Id. at 1097–98.   
 104. (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 424 (2000) (interpreting 
§ 2254(e)(2)). 
 105. Id. at 432.   
 106. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,698. 
 107. Id.  In this instance, the genetic connection between a provision in Chapter 
154 and the Powell Committee plan is especially clear.  The third exception 
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In accompanying commentary, the Committee explained that this 
plan would abrogate the exhaustion requirement with respect to 
some claims.108  If a claim was “actually presented and litigated” in 
state court, state remedies were exhausted and immediate federal 
adjudication would entail no departure from conventional 
doctrine.109  But if a federal court was to adjudicate a claim the 
prisoner had failed to “raise or develop” in state court, and the state 
courts might be willing to consider it, the exhaustion requirement 
had to be relaxed.110  That was the Committee’s proposal for a claim 
that fit one of the exceptions.  Put explicitly, if the prisoner failed to 
exhaust state remedies for one of those three reasons, the federal 
habeas court should not send the prisoner back to state court.111  Nor 
should the federal court permit the prisoner to go back.  Instead, the 
federal court should itself complete the record and determine 
whether the claim was meritorious.112 
The Powell Committee’s program was problematic.  Discarding the 
exhaustion doctrine with respect to any claims would have sacrificed 
all the values generally said to be served by requiring prisoners first to 
present their claims in state court—for example, avoiding 
interference with available, or even ongoing, state proceedings and 
ensuring that state courts have the opportunity to correct their own 
errors of federal law.113  Abandoning exhaustion would also have 
been at odds with the general project to foster improved state court 
proceedings in which death row prisoners, aided by appointed 
counsel, would have a better chance to resolve their federal claims.  
We will see that the Committee itself proposed that the 180-day filing 
period for petitions subject to Chapter 154 should allow for state 
court litigation in advance of federal habeas.114 
Moreover, the Committee proposed to discard the exhaustion 
requirement with respect to claims regarding which exhaustion may 
be most justified.  The three exceptions do not capture circumstances 
                                                          
described in § 2264(a) carries forward errors in the Committee recommendation.  
Presumably, the idea is that the claim itself, not the prisoner’s “failure to raise” the 
claim, is based on new evidence.  Moreover, an exception for cases in which the 
factual predicate could “not” have been discovered through the exercise of due 
diligence inexplicably makes the prisoner’s efforts irrelevant.  See infra note 153. 
 108. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,698.   
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.   
 113. The Committee suggested that the states would “prefer to see post-conviction 
litigation go forward in capital cases,” even at the expense of “a minor subordination 
of their interest[s].”  Id.  
 114. See infra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
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in which it would be a waste of time for the prisoner to return to state 
court.  They describe conditions under which the state courts might 
well understand the prisoner’s inability to raise a claim earlier and 
thus make a state channel available.  Indeed, the state courts might 
be receptive to the substance of a claim that, for example, rests on 
newly discovered evidence.115 
By contrast to the Powell Committee program, § 2264 should be 
interpreted to preserve the exhaustion doctrine and its corollaries—
that is, a federal habeas court typically must dismiss a claim if it has 
not been presented in the state courts and those courts are open to 
receive it; a prisoner who suffers dismissal for want of exhaustion may 
return to federal court when no state court avenue is available; and 
the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if a claim was presented to the 
state courts even if the state courts declined to consider it.  These 
familiar propositions not only retain an important role for state courts 
in postconviction litigation.  They conform to other developments in 
habeas law that the Powell Committee did not anticipate. 
Recall again that the Committee adopted its plan in 1989 and 
assumed that other aspects of existing law would remain in place.  In 
that context, it was feasible to propose that, to save time in some 
capital cases, a federal court should relax the usual requirement that 
a prisoner first seek relief in state court.  Then, in 1996, AEDPA’s 
adoption of § 2254(d) and § 2254(e) significantly limited a federal 
court’s authority to hold its own hearing and examine a federal claim 
de novo in the wake of an unfavorable determination in state court.  
It would have been strange if AEDPA had adopted the Powell 
Committee’s plan for abandoning the exhaustion requirement in 
some death penalty cases, thus eliminating a prisoner’s responsibility 
(and ability) to obtain state court determinations on which § 2254(d) 
and § 2254(e) would depend.  The text of § 2264 does not compel 
such an odd conclusion, but rather lends itself to an interpretation 
that preserves the general exhaustion doctrine intact. 
Section 2264(a) initially states that a federal habeas court “shall 
only” consider a claim that was “raised and decided on the merits” in 
state court.  This much is plainly consistent with the exhaustion 
doctrine.  If a claim was presented to the state courts and they 
                                                          
 115. The Committee plan would have been difficult to administer.  A litigant is 
generally master of the claims he or she wishes to press, and it is not obvious that a 
federal court can disallow a prisoner to withdraw a claim, far less prevent the 
prisoner from taking the claim to state courts willing to receive it.  The Anti-
Injunction Act typically bars a federal court from interfering with pending 
proceedings in state court.  28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012). 
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responded by deciding it on the merits, state avenues for litigation 
have been exhausted and the claim is ready for federal consideration. 
The Court has held that a state court adjudicated a claim “on the 
merits” within the meaning of § 2254(d) if the court evaluated the 
claim “based on the intrinsic right and wrong of the matter.”116  It 
does not follow that the same formulation necessarily carries the 
same meaning in § 2264(a).117  But in this instance consistent usage 
makes sense.  Indeed, the “on the merits” formulations in the two 
provisions can easily be understood to reinforce each other—the one 
specifying the kind of state court action that triggers federal 
deference to a state court’s result, the other explaining that a federal 
court will typically examine cases in which the state court has been 
asked to do, and has done, what is necessary to summon the respect 
that § 2254(d) mandates.  If the state court decision was not on the 
merits, the federal court, now proceeding under § 2254(e), will 
typically presume that any relevant facts the state court found are 
accurate and will deny a hearing if the facts did not come out for 
reasons ascribable to the prisoner.  Here again, it is significant that 
the 180-day filing period is suspended while a prisoner presses state 
courts to consider a federal claim.118 
The general rule stated in § 2264(a), that is, that a federal court 
will “only” adjudicate a claim the state courts were willing to entertain 
when it was raised, holds “unless the failure to raise the claim 
properly” is explained by one of the exceptions listed in 
§ 2264(a)(1)–(3).  The content of the exceptions is taken from the 
Powell Committee, where the exceptions identified circumstances in 
which a prisoner failed to exhaust state remedies but nonetheless 
should be entitled to immediate federal adjudication of the merits.119  
We have said that the three exceptions are ill-suited for that task 
inasmuch as they actually describe claims the state courts may be 
open to entertain.120  The exceptions are intelligible, however, if they 
are understood to signify claims the state courts should be willing to 
consider, but nonetheless turn away because of the prisoner’s default 
in earlier state proceedings.  If such claims are foreclosed in federal 
court, it is not because the prisoner has failed to exhaust state 
                                                          
 116. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.   
 117. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501–05 (2001) 
(explaining that “on the merits” is not a term of art with a settled meaning).   
 118. See infra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 120. See supra text accompanying note 115. 
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remedies, but because the federal courts give effect to state 
procedural grounds of decision.121 
There is an argument for reading § 2264 to discard the exhaustion 
requirement, but it falls well short of an inescapable command.  
Under § 2264(b), a district court is to “rule” on claims “properly 
before” the court “[f]ollowing review subject to subsections (a), (d), 
and (e) of section 2254.”122  That list of § 2254 subsections omits 
subsections (b) and (c), which codified the general exhaustion 
doctrine in 1948.123  The Court has acknowledged the possible 
inference that a federal court is to determine the merits of a claim 
without regard to the usual requirement that state remedies must first 
be exhausted.124 
But, in this instance, the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon is 
even weaker than usual.  Consider, first, that § 2264(b) does not list 
each of the other subsections in § 2254, thus arguably highlighting 
the omission of subsections (b) and (c) having to do with exhaustion.  
Instead, § 2264(b) lists three subsections, (a), (d), and (e), and leaves 
out all the others—including (b) and (c), but also subsections (f), 
(g), (h), and (i).  So the textual wrinkle searching for an explanation 
is not the negative choice to omit subsections (b) and (c), but the 
                                                          
 121. The Powell Committee contended that “exhaustion is futile in the great 
majority of cases” because “of the existence of state procedural default rules.”  
POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,698.  But, of course, if the state 
courts are not open to a claim because of a prisoner’s failure to comply with state 
procedural law earlier, the exhaustion requirement is not “futile,” but satisfied; 
because of the prisoner’s default, there is no currently available avenue for litigating 
the claim in state court.  On its face, § 2264(a) appears to allow for only two 
categories of claims—those the state courts decided on the merits and those they 
refused to consider because of the prisoner’s earlier default.  Yet there are other 
claims the state courts had the chance to address, but claims they overlooked or 
disregarded.  Notice that the Powell Committee stated that a federal court should 
consider a claim that was “actually raised and litigated” in state court—thus not 
(necessarily) “decided.”  In all candor, the Chapter 154 drafters probably did not 
conceive that state courts might simply brush off claims brought to their attention.  
In any event, the affirmative statement that a federal court shall “only” entertain a 
claim that was decided on the merits need not be read to disclaim consideration of a 
claim that was raised by the prisoner but ignored by the state court.  It would be 
nonsense to box a claim out of federal court because of a state court’s oversight.  
And it would be perverse to encourage state courts to thwart claims by disregarding 
them when they are properly presented.  One can read § 2264(a) that way only by 
drawing a negative inference that is clearly rebutted by a much more plausible 
alternative:  The modifier “only” distinguishes between claims the state courts were 
willing to entertain and decide and claims they found state law reasons to avoid.  It 
does not foreclose federal adjudication of a claim regarding which state remedies 
have been exhausted for reasons other than default. 
 122. The Court has explained that the subsections (d) and (e) to which § 2264(b) 
refers are the provisions AEDPA adopted with those headings, not the provisions that 
bore the same designations previously.  Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 332 (1997).  
 123. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 124. Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 (assuming this interpretation for purposes of analysis). 
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affirmative selection of subsections (a), (d), and (e).  There is a 
perfectly plausible reason for stating that district courts are to address 
claims in Chapter 154 cases in light of subsections (d) and (e)—
namely, to clarify that those particular subsections apply to cases 
pending on the date of enactment.125 
Note, too, that the subsections in § 2254 at issue, subsections (b) 
and (c), were themselves amended by AEDPA in ways that serve state 
interests.  For example, under one amendment, codified at 
§ 2254(b)(3), the respondent in a habeas action cannot be “deemed 
to have waived the exhaustion requirement” unless counsel 
surrenders the point “expressly.”  That adjustment ensures that state 
courts will not lose the chance to examine federal claims through 
some error or oversight.  It would make no sense to read AEDPA to 
enact § 2254(b)(3) to govern all habeas cases and then, in the next 
breath, to eliminate the exhaustion doctrine wholesale in capital 
cases subject to Chapter 154.126 
Consider, next, that § 2264(b) instructs the district court to “rule” 
on claims without reference to ruling “on the merits.”  A federal 
court can “rule” on a claim by dismissing it for failure to comply with 
the exhaustion requirement—again without prejudice to another try 
when state opportunities for adjudicating the claim are no longer 
available.127  The Powell Committee did specify that a federal court 
should rule “on the merits” of a claim.128  That was in keeping with 
the Committee’s plan to eschew exhaustion in some cases.129  In the 
alternative, § 2264(b) can be read to contemplate ruling on the 
substance of a claim, but still to accommodate dismissal for want of 
exhaustion.  The text instructs the district court to rule on claims 
“properly before it,” which ordinarily do not include claims the state 
courts are willing to entertain.  The Powell Committee, too, would 
                                                          
 125. Id. at 335.  The Court explained in Lindh that independent language in 
Chapter 154 made its provisions applicable to cases already under way (provided the 
prerequisites for triggering this optional chapter were satisfied).  In the absence of 
similar language on the temporal reach of amendments to Chapter 153, AEDPA’s 
provisions affecting that chapter were applicable only prospectively.  
 126. In Lindh, the Court also cited the AEDPA amendment codified in 
§ 2254(b)(2), authorizing district courts to deny a claim on the merits 
“notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the 
courts of the State.”  Id. at 333 n.7.  Inasmuch as that amendment permits immediate 
federal adjudication when the door to state court is ostensibly open, its existence 
does not greatly strengthen the case for reading § 2264(b) to accommodate the 
exhaustion requirement. 
 127. Cf. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1097 (2013) (explaining that a state 
court can “decide” a claim for purposes of judicial review without deciding it “on the 
merits” for purposes of § 2254(d)). 
 128. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,698. 
 129. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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have had the federal court deal with claims “properly before it.”130  
Then again, under the Committee’s plan, some premature claims 
would be “properly” before the court.  The points we have just made 
explain why § 2264 should not be read to adopt that view. 
2.  The total exhaustion rule 
Section 2264 should be interpreted to discard the “total” 
exhaustion rule, which has it that if any claim in a multi-claim federal 
petition is premature, the district court cannot consider other claims 
that are ready for federal adjudication.131  Abrogation of “total” 
exhaustion rests comfortably with the text.  We have seen that the 
language in § 2264(a) restricting a federal court to claims that were 
“raised and decided on the merits in the State courts” comports with 
the general exhaustion requirement in that it makes no provision for 
immediate adjudication of premature claims.  On the positive side, 
this same language is consistent with federal consideration of claims 
the state courts have had an opportunity to address.  Moreover, 
under § 2264(b), a federal court is to rule on claims “properly before 
it”—which can easily be understood to mean claims regarding which 
state remedies have been exhausted. 
Understanding § 2264 to abandon the total exhaustion rule does 
not depend on a negative inference from the omission of § 2254(b)–
(c) from § 2264(b).  The total exhaustion idea has no foundation in 
the general exhaustion doctrine historically, far less in its codification 
in 1948.  The Supreme Court established the total exhaustion rule to 
deal with cases Congress had not anticipated—namely, cases in which 
prisoners file federal petitions containing both mature and 
premature claims.132  Total exhaustion is actually in tension with the 
general exhaustion doctrine.  It posits a claim or claims the state 
courts have had a chance to address and still requires a federal court 
to postpone the exercise of jurisdiction. 
There are independent policy reasons for resolving any ambiguity 
in favor of interpreting § 2264 to repudiate the total exhaustion rule.  
The rule exacerbates the tensions between the general exhaustion 
requirement and the filing periods AEDPA introduces for seeking 
federal habeas relief.  We will see below that an amendment to 
                                                          
 130. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,698. 
 131. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
 132. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516–17 (1982).  The Powell Committee 
explained that its program contemplated “a change in the exhaustion doctrine as 
articulated in Rose v. Lundy.”  POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,698.  
Then again, the Committee may have cited Lundy only for its boilerplate recitation of 
the exhaustion doctrine generally.   
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Chapter 153 creates a one-year statute of limitation for habeas cases 
generally.  The Supreme Court has held that the one-year period is 
tolled while a prisoner pursues postconviction relief in state court, 
but not while a habeas petition is pending in federal court.133  So a 
prisoner may lodge a multi-claim federal petition within the filing 
period, the district court may take some time to decide whether the 
exhaustion doctrine has been satisfied, and then, under the total 
exhaustion rule, the court must dismiss the entire petition if there is 
an available avenue for litigating a single claim in state court.  By this 
time, most of the year allowed has gone by, and the prisoner is 
challenged to go to state court, exhaust state remedies with respect to 
that claim, and get back to federal court before the clock runs out. 
The 180-day filing period Chapter 154 establishes for capital cases 
underscores this practical point.  If nothing mitigated the pressure, 
prisoners under sentence of death would have much greater difficulty 
in both satisfying the exhaustion requirement and meeting the 
applicable filing deadline.  The consequences would be severe.  Very 
likely, prisoners would be unable to please both masters, and 
potentially meritorious claims would be boxed out of federal court.  
It makes sense, then, that § 2264 should abrogate the total 
exhaustion rule in death penalty cases—an interpretation the text of 
this provision will easily bear.  In the case of a multi-claim federal 
petition, the federal court should readily adjudicate mature claims 
and decline to consider only claims that are premature.  The prisoner 
should then be entitled to exhaust state remedies with respect to 
premature claims and renew them in federal court when they are ready. 
3.  Procedural default in state court 
Section 2264 should be interpreted essentially to endorse the 
Supreme Court’s decisions on the federal consequences of a 
prisoner’s procedural default in state court.  Some of the basic cases 
were in place when AEDPA was enacted, but the Court has continued 
to shape its doctrine since 1996.  Moreover, the Court has often read 
provisions in Chapter 153 to restrict the circumstances in which 
federal courts can reach the merits, thus arriving, here again, at 
arrangements for all habeas cases that, apart from these 
developments, § 2264 might have reserved for capital cases alone.134 
The text of § 2264 accommodates the elements of the Court’s 
analysis.  Recall that the initial questions are matters of state law:  The 
                                                          
 133. See infra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
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prisoner must have failed to raise a federal claim at the time and in 
the manner prescribed by state law, and, for that reason, the state 
courts refused (or clearly would refuse) to address the claim.  Section 
2264(a) states that a federal court can entertain only a claim that was 
“raised and decided on the merits in the State courts,”135 then creates 
exceptions for cases in which the prisoner failed to raise a claim 
“properly.”  No stretch of the imagination is necessary to interpret 
“properly” in this context to mean in conformity with state 
procedural rules.  Moreover, since compliance with state procedures 
is a state law question, it is perfectly reasonable to understand that, at 
this point, § 2264(a) addresses cases in which the exhaustion doctrine 
is satisfied, but only because of the state courts’ unwillingness to consider 
a claim in light of a prisoner’s default in earlier state proceedings. 
Section 2264 could not sensibly dispense with these state law issues.  
If it did, this provision would have to entail its own independent body 
of federal standards for the conduct of litigation in state court.  
Federal habeas courts would have to formulate that federal law and 
hold prisoners and counsel to it (in state court) on pain of forfeiting 
the opportunity to advance claims in federal court.  The consequence 
could only be nontrivial adjustments in state criminal procedure as 
state courts and counsel ensure that both state and federal 
procedural rules are followed.  It is scarcely reasonable to read 
federal interference with state arrangements into § 2264 without 
explicit textual warrant.  Consider, too, that if a prisoner failed only 
to comply with federal procedures ascribed to § 2264, but state courts 
were open to entertain a claim in light of state procedural law, the 
disposition in federal court would be controlled by the exhaustion 
doctrine.  There would be a currently available state court way to 
litigate the claim. 
Following threshold state issues, the first federal question under 
the Court’s default doctrine is whether the state procedural basis for 
declining to adjudicate a claim constitutes an adequate and 
independent state law ground of decision.  This aspect of default 
doctrine, too, is applicable in Chapter 154 cases, unless it is eclipsed 
by the text.  It is not disclaimed explicitly, and a stretch of the 
imagination would be required to interpret silence in § 2264 to 
abandon so established a doctrine by negative implication.  The 
Warren Court once banished the adequate state ground doctrine 
from habeas corpus on the theory that federal habeas courts do not 
                                                          
 135. We have defused any suggestion that claims the state courts ignored are 
foreclosed.  See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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review state court judgments for error and thus are not required to 
defer to state decisions that rest on state law alone.136  But the 
Rehnquist Court resurrected the adequate state ground doctrine in 
habeas, and, ever since, the Court has maintained its place in the 
federal law of default.137 
If a state procedural ground for declining to entertain a federal 
question is inadequate, ceteris paribus a federal habeas court may 
itself take up the claim.  The rationale for this aspect of default 
doctrine is noncontroversial.  If, for example, the state courts 
refused to address a potentially meritorious federal claim on the 
strength of an arbitrary or inconsistently applied procedural rule, it 
would hardly make sense to say that the resulting state judgment, 
grounded in state law, forecloses federal adjudication of the federal 
claim.138  Now then, the standard for adequacy has never been 
prisoner-friendly, and decisions since 1996 have dropped the bar 
increasingly low.139  The point here is that § 2264 sets it no lower for 
capital cases subject to Chapter 154. 
More commonly, state law grounds are adequate and thus typically 
forestall federal habeas adjudication.140  Yet there are exceptions.  
The Court recognizes that there are some good reasons why the state 
courts should overlook default, and reasons why, if the state courts 
decline, federal courts should be open.  These exceptions go under 
familiar headings—namely, cases in which prisoners show “cause and 
prejudice” or “actual innocence.”  Section 2264(a)(1)–(3) does not 
employ these same headings.  Yet before we leap to the conclusion 
                                                          
 136. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429–31 (1963). 
 137. Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1130–31 (2011) (reaffirming the doctrine); 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81–83 (1977) (reviving the doctrine in habeas 
cases); see Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 523 (1997) (explaining that the 
adequate state ground doctrine applies in habeas by analogy).  Critics of the 
(unsuccessful) Streamlined Procedures Act read it to contemplate changes in the 
Court’s default doctrine in general and in this aspect of that doctrine in particular.  
See, e.g., Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement Act of 2005 and the Streamlined Procedures Act 
of 2005:  Hearing on H.R. 3060 and H.R. 3035 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & 
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 98, 106 (2005) (statement 
of Bernard E. Harcourt); Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005:  Hearing on H.R. 3035 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 295 (2005) (statement of Seth P. Waxman).  Congress ultimately 
adopted some ideas from the SPA, notably the transfer of authority to certify state 
programs for providing counsel to the Attorney General.  But nothing touching 
default doctrine emerged from committee. 
 138. E.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 366 (2002) (concluding that a state court’s 
application of a state rule was inadequate to bar habeas adjudication of a federal claim).   
 139. See, e.g., Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60 (2009) (holding that a state rule 
that allows for state court discretion may be adequate to foreclose habeas 
adjudication even though it is obviously applied inconsistently).   
 140. See, e.g., Kemna, 534 U.S. at 375–76 (explaining as much). 
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that this provision in Chapter 154 sweeps away a large share of the 
Supreme Court’s habeas jurisprudence—much of it meant to 
circumscribe federal adjudication in capital cases—we should ask 
whether the specific text commands that result or, instead, will bear 
an interpretation more in line with existing case law. 
On examination, § 2264 can and should be read largely to codify 
the exceptions the Supreme Court has identified, albeit under 
different names.  Indeed, the Court has already gone a goodly way 
toward this conclusion.  Notice initially that the exceptions specified 
in § 2264(a)(1)–(3) are triggered by a prisoner’s “failure” to raise a 
federal claim in state court.  The Court has interpreted similar 
language in another AEDPA amendment to Chapter 153—28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(e)(2).  In that context, the Court has explained that a 
prisoner “failed” to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court 
if he or she was responsible for poor fact-finding.141  If, however, the 
prisoner made a “diligent search for evidence” supporting the claim, 
but was unsuccessful for some reason beyond his or her control, the 
prisoner did not “fail” to develop the facts within the meaning of 
§ 2254(e)(2) and need not meet the standards that would apply if 
diligence had not been exercised.142  Equally here, § 2264(a) should 
be understood to contemplate a want of diligence on the prisoner’s 
part, in the absence of which there was no “failure” to raise the claim 
in state court and, accordingly, there is no occasion for consulting 
the standards in § 2264(a)(1)–(3).143 
If a prisoner did not diligently attempt to comply with state law, the 
three exceptions specified in § 2264(a)(1)–(3) come into play.  The 
first of these, described in § 2264(a)(1), captures cases in which the 
prisoner’s failure to raise a claim in state court is explained by the 
state’s violation of the Constitution or other federal law.  This 
grouping covers most of the instances in which the Court has found 
“cause” for prisoners’ failure to comply with state procedural rules—
for example, when state authorities interfered with a prisoner’s access 
to the courts,144 when prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence,145 
                                                          
 141. (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 424 (2000). 
 142. Id. at 435. 
 143. Herein another reason for interpreting § 2264(a) to permit federal 
adjudication of a claim a prisoner presented to the state courts only to see it ignored.  
See supra note 121. 
 144. E.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (invalidating the practice of screening 
prisoner petitions for judicial review). 
 145. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 690 (2004). 
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when prosecutors or other state officials concealed facts supporting 
claims,146 and when default was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.147 
The second exception, defined in § 2264(a)(2), attends to cases in 
which a prisoner should be forgiven for failing to anticipate the 
emergence of a “new Federal right” that is “retroactively applicable” 
in collateral proceedings.  This grouping also has analogs in existing 
case law, though the Court expects a prisoner to foresee most legal 
developments.148  Section 2264(a)(2) is more prisoner-friendly than 
the Court’s doctrine inasmuch as it reaches any new rule claim that is 
enforceable in federal habeas.  Still, the affected class is marginal.  
Under independent precedents, claims based on new rules are rarely 
cognizable, whether or not they were raised seasonably in state court.149 
The third exception, described in § 2264(a)(3), excuses default 
when the factual predicate of a claim “could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence” in time for state or 
federal postconviction proceedings.150  This category, too, overlaps 
with the circumstances in which “cause” can be found under the 
Court’s decisions—namely, when the factual basis of a claim was not 
“reasonably available.”151  The Court has interpreted identical 
language in § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) to mean new evidence that “did not 
exist” to be discovered when the prisoner was in state court.152  This 
exception in § 2264(a)(3) thus complements the threshold 
requirement that default was due to the prisoner’s “failure” to raise 
the claim.  If the prisoner was diligent, but the factual predicate of 
the claim still was not discovered, a federal court can adjudicate the 
merits without reaching this exception.  If the prisoner was not 
diligent, the court must turn to this exception and determine 
whether the prisoner’s neglect made any difference.  If not—if the 
                                                          
 146. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1988). 
 147. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 
1320 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013), the Court held that, 
if an application for state postconviction relief was a prisoner’s first realistic 
opportunity to advance a claim of ineffective assistance at trial, counsel’s 
(nonconstitutional) ineffectiveness in failing to raise the claim at the postconviction 
stage can constitute “cause.”  If the issue were presented in a death penalty case 
subject to Chapter 154, the Court should hold that effective assistance is 
constitutionally mandated in “initial-review collateral proceedings,” and, accordingly, 
that counsel’s default falls within § 2264(a)(1). 
 148. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982) (holding that a prisoner must 
advance a novel claim if a basis for it is available and other counsel have perceived 
the claim and pressed it in other cases).   
 149. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (at once expanding what counts as 
a “new” rule for habeas purposes and restricting the enforceability of “new” rules in 
federal collateral proceedings).   
 150. This is the best understanding of the grammatically flawed text.  See supra note 107.   
 151. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 152. (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000).   
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facts could not have been discovered anyway—then, too, the federal 
court can entertain the claim.153 
Nothing in § 2264 corresponds expressly to the usual requirement 
that prisoners demonstrate not only “cause” for default in state court, 
but “prejudice” flowing from the federal error that went uncorrected.  
There are reasons why § 2264 might discard the “prejudice” prong of 
existing doctrine.  The “prejudice” requirement has rarely figured 
greatly in the Court’s analysis of default cases and, indeed, has 
typically floated into the elements of prisoners’ substantive claims.154  
Nevertheless, in keeping with the project to reconcile Chapter 154 
with habeas law generally, we should not lightly infer that this or any 
aspect of default doctrine has been jettisoned by negative 
implication.  To the extent “prejudice” is a distinct consideration, 
§ 2264 should be read to contemplate that it must be demonstrated 
in capital cases subject to Chapter 154, just as in other habeas cases. 
Section 2264 is also ambiguous regarding the last element of 
conventional default doctrine—namely, the “miscarriage of justice” 
exception.  If a constitutional violation in state court probably 
resulted in the conviction of “one who is actually innocent,” a federal 
habeas court can overlook default and reach the merits “even in the 
absence of a showing of cause . . . .”155  Just as § 2264 should not be 
read to relax the “prejudice” requirement for death row prisoners, 
this provision in Chapter 154 should be read to accommodate the 
                                                          
 153. The Court adopted this understanding of the opening paragraph of 
§ 2254(e)(2), § 2254(e) (2)(A)(ii), and the interplay between the two in (Michael) 
Williams.  It must be said, however, that the Court’s interpretation of 
§ 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) needlessly complicates the interpretation of similar language 
when it appears elsewhere.  See infra note 160.  The drafters almost certainly meant to 
hold a prisoner responsible for attempting to develop facts supporting their claims in 
state court and thus to forestall federal habeas adjudication if a prisoner did not 
make a serious effort.  Accordingly, they should have allowed federal consideration 
of evidence that could have been discovered via a diligent effort—rather than 
evidence that could not have been discovered even if the prisoner had been diligent.  
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (2012) (starting AEDPA’s general filing period on the 
date the factual basis of a claim “could have been discovered through the exercise of 
due diligence”).  Of course, if evidence would have escaped detection no matter 
what a prisoner did in state court, it makes sense that the evidence should be heard 
in federal court when it comes to light.  But it makes no sense to limit federal court 
proceedings to evidence of that kind alone—a point the Court plainly appreciated in 
(Michael) Williams.  The explanation for the text of § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) is scrivener’s 
error.  More vexing still, this error by the AEDPA drafters was apparently a negligent 
adoption of careless language in the Powell Committee plan.  See supra note 107. 
 154. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  The obvious example is a claim 
that counsel delivered ineffective assistance, which entails both poor performance 
and resulting “prejudice.”  See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective 
Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 684–
85 (1990) (appraising “prejudice” as a feature of default doctrine and as an element 
of a meritorious Sixth Amendment claim). 
 155. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).  See supra text accompanying note 98.   
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longstanding safety valve for cases in which innocent individuals may 
have been convicted of capital crimes. 
A credible showing of actual innocence creates a “gateway” to 
federal adjudication not only when the Court’s own default doctrine 
would otherwise bar a claim, but also when a statute appears on its 
face to foreclose a claim without making provision for “probable 
innocence” cases.156  The Court has held that this exception survives 
AEDPA and operates unless a statutory provision in Chapter 153 
contains a “clear command” countering a federal court’s 
discretion.157  There is no obvious reason why the same door should 
not be open when a provision in Chapter 154 is invoked.  A statute 
may expressly “modify” the “miscarriage of justice” exception.  But 
when a statute is silent regarding this important idea, the proper 
inference is not that the exception is repudiated, but just the opposite.158 
This conclusion is fortified by other AEDPA provisions in both 
Chapter 153 and Chapter 154.  Recall that § 2262 explicitly 
contemplates that stays of execution are available, even mandated, 
when prisoners secure approval to file second or successive 
applications for federal relief under § 2244(b).159  Under 
§ 2244(b)(2), in turn, a claim that was omitted from a prior federal 
petition usually must be dismissed, but can be entertained if “the 
factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered 
previously through the exercise of due diligence”160 and there is 
“clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no 
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 
underlying offense.”  Plainly, then, § 2262 and § 2244(b)(2) allow for 
a second or successive federal petition when a prisoner offers new 
evidence that draws his or her guilt into serious question.  If AEDPA 
makes that policy choice when a prisoner has defaulted with respect 
to one federal petition and wants to return to the well, it is 
implausible that AEDPA makes no similar allowance for a prisoner 
                                                          
 156. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). 
 157. Id. (holding that a showing of actual innocence is an exception to the 
limitation period established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)); see infra note 233 and 
accompanying text. 
 158. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1935 n.3. 
 159. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 160. This language is virtually the same as the language in § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii), 
which the Court has held to contemplate evidence that could not have been 
discovered earlier because it did not yet exist.  That interpretation was helpful in 
reaching a workable understanding of the occasions when federal evidentiary 
hearings may be held.  Yet it is far too narrow to govern whether claims can be 
advanced in second or successive federal petitions.   
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who defaulted with respect to previous proceedings in state court and 
then offers a claim in an initial application for federal habeas relief.161 
The content of § 2264(a)(1)–(3) is clearly derived from the Powell 
Committee, which used these categories to identify circumstances 
explaining prisoners’ failure to exhaust state remedies.162  
Elaborating its program for stays of execution, however, the 
Committee said that some death row prisoners would be able to 
advance second or successive federal petitions for the purpose of 
presenting newly discovered evidence that undermines confidence in 
“the jury’s determination of guilt.”163 
There are also constitutional considerations.  The Court has 
described the “miscarriage of justice” exception as an “equitable” 
safeguard.164  Yet the gravity of the concern that an innocent might 
suffer suggests a constitutional footing.  Actual (factual) innocence 
may be an independent basis for federal habeas corpus relief.165  In 
any event, it is sensible to avoid constitutional issues by interpreting 
§ 2264’s failure to disclaim the “miscarriage of justice” element of 
default doctrine as a signal that this provision in Chapter 154 
presupposes it. 
Section 2264 should similarly be interpreted to preserve the 
understanding that prisoners who are shown to be ineligible for a 
death sentence can be regarded as innocent in a different way.  In 
the Court’s terminology, they are “innocent of the death penalty.”166  
Accordingly, if a prisoner shows “by clear and convincing evidence 
that but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would find him 
eligible for the death penalty,” default is excused and a federal court 
can reach the merits of a claim.167  The Powell Committee also 
proposed that prisoners should be able to attack their death 
sentences as well as their convictions, so long as they did so in initial 
                                                          
 161. The precise language in § 2244(b)(2) is a modification of the innocence 
exception that does not displace the exception in its conventional form where it 
continues to operate without alteration.  McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1933.   
 162. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 163. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,697. 
 164. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931.  
 165. The Court has famously assumed for purposes of decision that it would be 
unconstitutional to execute a prisoner who makes a “truly persuasive demonstration 
of ‘actual innocence’” and “there [is] no state avenue open to process such a claim.”  
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993); see also In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 952 
(2009) (accepting original habeas jurisdiction and transferring a case to a district 
court with instructions to “receive testimony and make findings of fact as to whether 
evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial clearly establishes 
petitioner’s innocence”). 
 166. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 343 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 167. Id. at 348. 
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applications for federal relief.168  Of course, § 2264 governs first 
petitions and thus, in light of its basis in the Committee plan, will 
bear the interpretation that new evidence going to eligibility for a 
capital sentence can be considered. 
Experience over the years has brought the Supreme Court to the 
conclusion that default doctrine, for all its rigidity, must still allow 
for the occasional case in which it becomes plain late in the process 
that a prisoner was erroneously given a death sentence.  Section 2264 
can be read to override the Court’s conclusion only by drawing a 
negative inference from silence.  It is that kind of barren formalism 
bereft of sound judgment that has in the past made habeas law the 
tragedy it so often is.  We need not make the same mistake in 
construing Chapter 154.169 
Finally, the Court has held that if a prisoner overcomes procedural 
default in state court, a federal district court can adjudicate the 
relevant claim de novo.170  Here again, § 2264 conforms to the 
Court’s doctrine.  For if one of the explanations for default in state 
court described in § 2264(a)(1)–(3) is established, § 2264(b) 
instructs the federal court to “rule” on the claim that now is “properly 
before it.”  We saw previously that ruling on a claim can mean a 
procedural disposition, the obvious example being dismissal for 
failure to exhaust state remedies.171  But with respect to a claim that 
fits one of the categories in § 2264(a)(1)–(3), a ruling on substance is 
easily covered. 
It is true that, on this reading, the federal court will adjudicate the 
merits of a claim without reference to any previous state court action 
that would activate § 2254(d) or 2254(e).  Yet interpreting 
§ 2264(a)(1)–(3) to address procedural default cases is not 
inconsistent with those provisions in the way that reading  
§ 2264(a)(1)–(3) to adopt the Powell Committee’s plan to abandon 
the exhaustion doctrine clearly would be.  Eliminating exhaustion in 
the cases described in § 2264(a)(1)–(3) would prevent prisoners 
from generating state determinations of law or fact on which 
§ 2254(d) and § 2254(e) might operate.  Taking those cases as 
instances of procedural default in state court contemplates that the 
state courts are unwilling to listen to a prisoner’s arguments or 
                                                          
 168. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,697–98. 
 169. The Judicial Conference recommended an amendment to the Powell 
Committee program, which would have permitted second or successive petitions 
challenging the “appropriateness” of a death sentence.  AD HOC COMM. ON FED. 
HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, COMMITTEE REPORT AND PROPOSAL 3 (1989). 
 170. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009). 
 171. See supra text accompanying note 127. 
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allegations.  Since there is no way to obtain state determinations that 
might engage § 2254(d) and § 2254(e), federal adjudication without 




According to this account, § 2264 rejects the Powell Committee’s 
proposal to abrogate the exhaustion doctrine with respect to some 
claims the state courts may be willing to entertain.  By contrast, 
§ 2264 preserves the exhaustion requirement generally for all claims 
and discards only the “total exhaustion” rule, which would complicate 
implementation of the 180-day filing period established by Chapter 
154.  A federal court is generally restricted to examining claims the 
state courts were asked to decide, and did decide, on the merits.  In 
those cases, consistent with § 2254(d), the court typically cannot hold 
a hearing to determine the facts underlying a claim, but must work 
with the factual record made in state court and, into the bargain, 
must defer to a state court’s decision unless it was unreasonable.172  If 
the state courts were presented with a claim, but overlooked it, state 
remedies have been exhausted, and the federal court can treat the 
claim de novo, albeit § 2254(e) may cabin the court’s authority to 
investigate the facts.  If the state courts declined, or clearly would 
decline, to entertain a claim because of the prisoner’s failure to 
comply with state procedural rules, the federal court must determine 
whether the state court application of state law counts as an adequate 
and independent ground of decision.  If it does, the federal court will 
consult § 2264(a)(1)–(3), which roughly parallels the tests the 
Supreme Court has established for determining whether federal 
adjudication should equally be barred.  If a claim survives that analysis, 
the federal court will entertain it de novo—again subject to § 2254(e). 
Here again, Chapter 154 places important limits on federal courts 
adjudicating capital habeas cases, but those limits are largely the same 
as the restrictions Congress and the Supreme Court have now 
imposed in all cases, both capital and noncapital. 
D.  Timing Rules 
Chapter 154 chiefly addresses the pace of capital habeas litigation 
in 28 U.S.C. § 2263, which establishes a filing period for petitions by 
death row prisoners in certified states.  Under § 2263(a), an 
application for habeas relief “must be filed” in a district court “not 
                                                          
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 100–01. 
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later than 180 days after final State court affirmance of the conviction 
and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for 
seeking such review.”  Under § 2263(b), the 180-day filing period is 
“tolled”:  (1) “from the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in the 
Supreme Court until the date of final disposition”—if the prisoner 
seeks direct review in the Supreme Court following the affirmance of 
his or her sentence on appeal in state court; (2) “from the date on 
which the first petition for post-conviction review or other collateral 
relief is filed until the final State court disposition of such petition;” 
and (3) “during an additional period not to exceed 30 days”—if the 
prisoner shows “good cause” for an “extension.” 
These timing rules for capital cases coexist with the rules for all 
habeas petitions challenging state criminal judgments, established by 
AEDPA’s amendments to Chapter 153.  Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1), “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”  This limitation period 
runs from the latest of four dates:  (A) “the date on which the 
judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 
expiration of the time for seeking such review;” (B) “the date on 
which the impediment to filing an application created by State action 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 
removed;” (C) “the date on which the constitutional right asserted 
was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 
applicable to cases on collateral review;” and (D) “the date on which 
the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have 
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”  Under 
§ 2244(d)(2), the filing period is tolled for the time “during which a 
properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 
review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 
The Powell Committee recommended a statute providing that a 
habeas petition “must be filed . . . within 180 days from the filing in 
the appropriate state court of record of an order” appointing counsel 
for state postconviction proceedings.173  That period was to be 
“tolled”:  “[f]rom the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in the 
Supreme Court until . . . final disposition of the petition”—if the 
prisoner “seeks review of a capital sentence” after direct review in the 
state “court of last resort,” and [d]uring “any period in which a state 
prisoner . . . has a properly filed request for post-conviction review 
                                                          
 173. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,697. 
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pending before a state court”—provided “all state filing rules are met 
in a timely manner.”174  Tolling was to continue “from the date that 
the . . . prisoner initially files for post-conviction review until final 
disposition . . . by the highest court of the State,” but not “during the 
pendency of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court 
following such State post-conviction review.”175  The Committee also 
recommended that extensions “not to exceed 60 days” should be 
available on a showing of “good cause.”176 
In the Chapter 154 cases to come, the challenge will be to make 
peace between § 2263 and the limitation period in § 2244(d)(1) for 
habeas cases generally, as well as the Powell Committee plan for 
capital litigation.  One thing is inescapable:  § 2263 establishes a filing 
period for death penalty cases that is only half as long as the period 
in § 2244(d)(1).  When the AEDPA drafters wrote provisions 
applicable to all habeas actions, they made one year the basic policy.  
But then they added Chapter 154, which took the 180-day rule from 
the Powell Committee.  The Committee, in turn, had framed its 
recommendation when there was no fixed filing period for habeas 
petitions in federal court.  Within that vacuum, the Committee 
justified the choice of 180 days on two grounds.  One was that some 
filing period was needed to encourage prisoners under sentence of 
death to pursue postconviction relief.177  The other was that a 180-day 
period was feasible because prisoners facing death would have lawyers 
to assist them.178 
One may question whether the Powell Committee appreciated 
what a brief filing period would mean for the prisoners and lawyers 
affected.  Practitioners need time to clear their schedules for the tasks 
entailed in capital litigation.  When they do break free from other 
responsibilities, they must study the existing record, investigate extra-
record events and circumstances, identify potentially viable claims, 
locate witnesses (often experts in capital cases), and marshal the 
evidence and available arguments.  All this, of course, is for purposes 
of applications for postconviction relief in state court—the 
proceedings for which the states must supply counsel.  Accordingly, it 
will be surprising if attorneys do not use up the lion’s share of 180 
days preparing and filing petitions for state relief, leaving little time 
for the petitions to which the 180-day rule actually applies—habeas 
                                                          
 174. Id. at 24,694, 24,697. 
 175. Id. at 24,697. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 24,697–98. 
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corpus applications in federal court.  The federal courts may not 
appoint counsel for federal habeas actions until state proceedings are 
nearly complete.179  So the lawyers who must meet the 180-day 
deadline by filing properly prepared federal petitions will be 
extremely hard pressed to do so. 
It is too late to complain that the Powell Committee failed to see 
that 180 days would be insufficient or to resist the plain language in 
§ 2263, which makes the basic 180-day rule law.  Yet we can be open 
to interpretations that reduce the harm § 2263 certainly will visit on 
capital cases.  The point of instituting a filing period is only to 
encourage prisoners who might otherwise be disinclined to pursue 
postconviction relief seasonably.  The idea is not to turn capital 
habeas litigation into an exercise in arithmetic.  Nor is it to 
manufacture dismissals for default.180 
1.  The nature of the filing period 
At the threshold, § 2263(a) should be interpreted as a 
nonjurisdictional limitation period rather than a constraint on a 
district court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  There is no justification 
for reading this provision to be jurisdictional; the consequences 
would be dramatic and entirely unjustified.  Jurisdictional restrictions 
are exempt from ordinary default doctrine and thus can be raised at 
any stage; parties have no capacity to consent to jurisdiction; courts 
are obliged to address jurisdiction requirements sua sponte and have 
no authority to relax them even in compelling circumstances.181 
It is settled that § 2244(d)(1) in Chapter 153 is not jurisdictional, 
but establishes only a statute of limitation.182  The text of § 2263 is 
drawn differently.  There is no explicit reference to a “period of 
limitation.”  Instead, § 2263(a) states that an application “must be 
filed” within 180 days—here borrowing from the Powell Committee 
almost verbatim.  Yet there is no reason to think that this formulation 
imposes a jurisdictional requirement where § 2244(d)(1) does not.  A 
                                                          
 179. One of the Chapter 154 provisions describing the states’ responsibilities, 
§ 2261(d), bars the appointment of an attorney who appeared at the trial in state 
court, except by special request, and it is not at all clear that lawyers who represented 
prisoners on direct review will be assigned to continue.  Indeed, there are good 
reasons for introducing new counsel to make a fresh start in postconviction 
proceedings.  See Anne M. Voigts, Note, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle:  Procedural 
Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1103, 1131 (1999) (explaining potential ethical dilemmas). 
 180. See POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,697 (explicitly 
disclaiming any such purpose). 
 181. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (rehearsing these familiar 
points in the habeas context). 
 182. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 213 (2006). 
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door-keeping rule is jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states that 
a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as 
jurisdictional.”183  The “must be filed” phrase falls well short of the 
exacting text that has been read to foreclose federal adjudicative 
power in other contexts.184  Moreover, § 2263 itself describes the 180-
day rule as a “time requirement” and even as a “time period”—terms 
that fall even further from the jurisdictional mark.  The “tolling” 
provisions are also consistent with a statute of limitations.  Hard 
jurisdictional mandates typically do not come with tolling rules, but 
statutes of limitation very often do. 
2.  Computation 
Some play in the joints should be found in computations of the 
180-day period.  To begin, the date on which the clock begins to tick 
(the date of “final State court affirmance of the conviction and 
sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 
such review”) should be interpreted to presuppose that counsel has 
been appointed for the prisoner.  This understanding reconciles 
§ 2263(a) with 28 U.S.C. § 2261, which makes all the provisions in 
Chapter 154 applicable in a case “only” if the prisoner has been 
supplied with counsel pursuant to a mechanism certified by the 
Attorney General.185 
To be sure, the text of § 2263(a) departs from the Powell 
Committee recommendation, which ran the 180-day period from the 
date of a state court “order” appointing counsel to invoke Chapter 
154 in a prisoner’s case.  Yet the coherence of the scheme the 
Committee envisioned for death penalty cases collapses if death row 
prisoners are held to a filing period that runs, and may run out, 
before counsel enters the picture.  Section 2263(a) plainly 
implements the Committee’s plan in this key respect and should be 
understood, accordingly, also to recognize that the appointment of 
                                                          
 183. Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 648 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 
515 (2006)). 
 184. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107, for example, “no appeal shall bring any 
judgment . . . of a civil nature before a court of appeals for review unless notice of 
appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such judgment . . . .”  See Bowles v. 
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 205–06 (2007) (holding that § 2107 is jurisdictional).   
 185. As originally enacted, 28 U.S.C. § 2265(c) delayed the 180-day period until 
counsel received a trial transcript.  That provision did not survive the USA PATRIOT 
Act amendments in 2005.  There is no evidence to suggest that its omission was 
significant.  The amendments so completely altered § 2265, chiefly by shifting 
responsibility for approving state counsel programs to the Attorney General, that 
some matters thought to be details doubtless fell through the cracks. 
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counsel naturally must precede the start of a filing period that is 
likely to be satisfied only with appointed counsel’s help.186 
Sadly, § 2263(a)’s baseline for computing the 180-day filing period 
cannot be read to adopt the conventional understanding of a “final” 
state judgment.  By traditional account, a state judgment becomes 
final only when proceedings in the Supreme Court itself are 
completed.  So, for example, the baseline in § 2244(d)(1)(A) for 
computing the general one-year filing period for federal habeas 
petitions is “the date on which the [state] judgment became final by 
the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 
seeking such review.”  The § 2244(d)(1)(A) clock thus starts well 
after direct review in state court comes to an end—when the 
Supreme Court disposes of a petition for certiorari challenging a 
conviction or sentence approved by the state appellate courts on 
direct review or, if a prisoner fails to file a petition for certiorari in 
the Supreme Court, when the time for doing so expires.187 
By contrast, § 2263(a) runs the 180-day filing period for death 
penalty cases from the “final State court affirmance of the conviction 
and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for 
seeking such review.”  That text is similar to the language in 
§ 2263(b)(2), which tolls the 180-day period.  The Supreme Court 
has said (in dicta) that, for purposes of § 2263(b)(2), the “final State 
court disposition” of a petition for state postconviction relief is the 
date on which the proceedings end in state court.188  We will see in a 
moment that the Court’s observation regarding § 2263(b)(2) is 
questionable.  If, then, the textual parallel with § 2263(b)(2) were the 
only basis for reading § 2263(a) to start the 180-day clock so early, we 
might open our minds to the possibility that the “final State court 
disposition” formulation in § 2263(a) does not arrive until the 
Supreme Court denies certiorari or the time for seeking certiorari 
runs out—that is, that the starting point for the 180-day clock in 
death penalty cases is the same as the starting point for the one-year 
clock that governs all habeas actions.  But there is more.  The tolling 
provision in § 2263(b)(1) explicitly suspends the 180-day period for 
proceedings in the Supreme Court following direct review in the 
state courts.  If the baseline for starting the § 2263(a) clock is not 
                                                          
 186. See supra text accompanying note 54 (noting that § 2262 also entitles a 
prisoner to a stay of execution as soon as counsel is appointed for state proceedings).  
The Final Rule responds to this point by defining the “appointment” of counsel as 
the “provision of counsel in a manner that is reasonably timely in light of the time 
limitations for seeking State and Federal postconviction review.” 
 187. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003). 
 188. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 334 (2007). 
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the conclusion of direct review in state court, it would be hard to 
account for dealing with subsequent Supreme Court proceedings in 
a tolling provision. 
If the analysis goes no further than this, § 2263(a) will hold death 
row prisoners to a filing period that not only ends earlier, but starts 
sooner, than the filing period that all petitioners face under 
§ 2244(d)(1).  But, of course, the analysis does not end here, but 
rather shifts to an examination of the tolling provisions in § 2263(b). 
3.  Tolling for Supreme Court proceedings 
The first provision on tolling the 180-day filing period, 
§ 2263(b)(1), should be interpreted to give death-sentenced 
prisoners the same amount of time to go to the Supreme Court on 
direct review that § 2244(d)(1)(A) grants prisoners in habeas cases 
not subject to Chapter 154.  Section 2244(d)(1)(A) creates time for 
the Supreme Court by postponing the baseline date for its (longer) 
clock.  Section 2263(b)(1) suspends the 180-day count from the “date 
that a petition for certiorari is filed . . . until the date of final 
disposition,” thus performing the same function by tolling a (shorter) 
clock that otherwise would be running. 
You will say that even if the effect of stopping the clock after it has 
started approaches the effect of postponing its start in the first place, 
the amount of time prisoners are allowed under the two provisions 
cannot be precisely the same.  By its explicit text, § 2263(b)(1) 
appears to let the clock run during the time a prisoner is considering 
and developing a certiorari petition but has yet to file it.  On 
examination, however, the apparent difference disappears.  Withhold 
judgment on this for the moment. 
The larger point is that, while the basic Chapter 154 limitation 
provision in § 2263(a) does not embrace the conventional definition 
of a final state court judgment (that is, the date on which the 
Supreme Court disposes of a petition for certiorari or there is no 
longer time to file one), the tolling provision in § 2263(b)(1) does.  
True, § 2263(b)(1) refers explicitly to the date on which a certiorari 
petition is “filed” and thus is open to the interpretation that it stops 
the clock only if a prisoner actually requests certiorari.  Recall that, by 
contrast, § 2244(d)(1)(A) expressly addresses cases in which 
certiorari is not sought by fixing the baseline for its limitation period 
as the expiration of the time for seeking Supreme Court review.  But 
this textual difference is not dispositive.  The Court has set the 
expressio unius canon aside in an analogous case.  The limitation 
period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) (for a motion attacking a 
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federal conviction or sentence) starts the clock when the judgment is 
“final,” without mention of direct review.  Yet the Court has held that, 
in parity with the explicit text of § 2244(d)(1)(A), a federal judgment 
is “final” for purposes of § 2255(f)(1) only when the Supreme Court 
acts on a certiorari petition or the time for filing one runs out.189  
There are good reasons for maintaining a uniform definition of a 
“final” judgment and for doubting that § 2263(b)(1) adopts a 
different understanding by omission alone.190 
It makes sense that the definition of finality incorporates the time 
allowed to pursue direct review in the Supreme Court even if no 
certiorari petition is actually filed.  The law allows state prisoners a 
limited amount of time to assess the advisability of going to the 
Supreme Court to challenge a state court judgment.  Prisoners 
cannot be said to be dilatory for using that time in an effort to make 
wise decisions.  Both § 2244(d)(1)(A) and § 2263(b)(1) respect 
prisoners’ right to request Supreme Court review.  Both should also 
respect their entitlement to weigh matters carefully before they do. 
Reading § 2263(b)(1) to toll the 180-day period only if prisoners 
actually file certiorari petitions would produce bad results.  Primarily, 
it would enhance the pressure on death row inmates, forcing them to 
find time within the 180-day allotment to consider direct review along 
with the pursuit of state postconviction and federal habeas relief.  All 
prisoners would find it more difficult to identify and press potentially 
meritorious claims; some would surely miss the 180-day deadline and 
forfeit the chance to get to federal habeas.  Prisoners who understand 
that the clock stops only if Supreme Court review is actually sought 
would have an incentive to file certiorari petitions simply to gain 
more time.  Knowledgeable prisoners who deliberate over filing 
certiorari petitions and conclude in the end that the effort would be 
wasted might still file anyway, again only to stop the clock governing 
access to habeas corpus. 
The text of § 2263(b)(1) is in substance identical to the text of the 
analog Powell Committee recommendation.  If it were clear that the 
Committee proposed to toll the 180-day clock only if a certiorari 
petition is actually filed, that history would cut against reading 
§ 2263(b)(1) to toll for the period when certiorari may be pursued 
                                                          
 189. Clay, 537 U.S. at 527.  
 190. The Court said in Clay that Congress might have mentioned the expiration of 
the time for seeking Supreme Court review in § 2244(d)(1)(A) to avoid any 
suggestion that the finality of a state judgment for federal purposes might turn on 
the peculiarities of state law.  Id. at 530–31.  That reason for special clarity is 
unnecessary with respect to § 2263(b)(1), which expressly deals with proceedings in 
the Supreme Court. 
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but, in fact, ultimately is not.  But the Powell Committee said only 
that a prisoner “risks losing the right to file” a habeas corpus petition 
in federal court “[u]nless the . . . prisoner actively litigates his case 
after his conviction and capital sentence have become final on direct 
appeal . . . .”191  Since a state judgment is not conventionally “final on 
direct appeal” until the time for seeking certiorari expires, the 
Committee’s insistence that prisoners should “actively” litigate after 
that date easily bears the interpretation that only the affirmative 
pursuit of postconviction relief is demanded.192 
Recall that the Powell Committee crafted the language that 
appears in § 2263(b)(1) in contemplation that the filing period 
would begin when a state court appointed counsel, without regard for 
the date of a final judgment on the prisoner’s claims.193  In that 
context, it may have appeared sensible to handle direct review in the 
Supreme Court with a tolling provision.  The AEDPA drafters 
obviously thought it was preferable to account for direct review by 
adopting the conventional definition of a final judgment as the 
baseline for a filing period governing federal habeas.  That is what 
they did in § 2244(d)(1)(A).  Then, however, the drafters attached 
the Powell Committee’s plan for death penalty cases without pausing 
to adjust the Committee’s means of dealing with Supreme Court 
proceedings on direct review.  Only a willful insistence on the letter 
of these provisions could produce an interpretation of § 2263(b)(1) 
that defies the uniform understanding of what counts as a final 
judgment.  The far better, pragmatic interpretation is that the textual 
differences here are the product of poor drafting and that AEDPA 
adopts the account of final judgments most clearly articulated in 
§ 2244(d)(1)(A), but also embodied in § 2263(b)(1). 
Return now to the ostensible difference between the mechanisms 
§ 2244(d)(1) and § 2263 employ to account for direct review in the 
Supreme Court.  The use of tolling in § 2263 does suggest that 
prisoners will be charged for the time before they actually file a 
certiorari petition.  Yet, as we have seen, the text can and should be 
read to suspend the 180-day period until the expiration of the time 
for requesting Supreme Court review.  If, in the case of a prisoner 
who decides against going to the Supreme Court, § 2263(b)(1) tolls 
the filing period until the time for seeking direct review expires, 
                                                          
 191. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,697–98. 
 192. See id. at 24,698 (explaining that the idea was “to encourage litigants to initiate 
the post-conviction review process and to keep it moving from stage to stage”).  Of 
course, it is also perfectly sensible to say that a prisoner who uses the time permitted for 
a certiorari petition to evaluate his or her position is “actively” litigating. 
 193. See supra text accompanying note 173. 
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there is no reason why, in the case of a prisoner who decides to 
pursue direct review, the time used to make that decision should 
count against the 180-day clock.  The same policies are implicated, 
and the same pragmatic interpretation should obtain.  The baseline 
for the limitation period in § 2244(d)(1)(A) and the tolling provision 
in § 2263(b)(1) therefore allow prisoners the same amount of time to 
apply for direct review in the Supreme Court after their convictions 
and sentences are affirmed in state court. 
Under § 2263(b)(1), the 180-day clock unquestionably stops when 
a certiorari petition is “filed” in the Supreme Court.  A petition 
should be understood to be “filed” for these purposes when it is 
received in the clerk’s office.  The Court has explained that an 
application for state postconviction relief is “filed” within the 
meaning of § 2244(d)(2) when “it is delivered to, and accepted by, 
the appropriate court officer.”194  The same interpretation should be 
placed on the identical term in § 2263(b)(1).  Once again, consistent 
usage is not a given.  But there is no warrant for thinking these two 
provisions adopt different definitions, and a single account of the 
term “filed” produces attractive results. 
According to this understanding of “filed,” a certiorari petition 
initiates tolling irrespective of any conditions that may justify its 
dismissal.  Satisfaction of filing conditions goes to the different 
question whether a petition is “properly” filed.  The Court has held 
that an application for state postconviction relief is “properly” filed 
for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) if “its delivery and acceptance are in 
compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings”—
which “usually prescribe . . . the form of the document, the time 
limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be 
lodged, and the requisite filing fee.”195  Section 2263(b)(1) does not 
specify that a certiorari petition must be “properly” filed to stop the 
180-day clock, and that modifier need not be read into it.196 
This is not to rely on the very textual literalism this article 
disclaims, only to explain that one need not fight the text of 
§ 2263(b)(1) to arrive at an interpretation that avoids mischief.  If 
certiorari petitions had to comply with filing conditions to qualify for 
tolling, prisoners who lodge petitions in the Supreme Court in the 
                                                          
 194. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that a state petition is “filed” 
even if it contains a claim that is procedurally barred). 
 195. Id. at 8; see Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005) (holding that an 
untimely application for state relief is not “properly” filed). 
 196. The Powell Committee also had it that the filing period should be tolled 
from the date a petition for certiorari is “filed” without more.  See supra text 
accompanying note 173.  
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belief that the federal habeas clock will be suspended might find at 
some point that the clock has been running all the while, because 
their petitions are dismissed for failure to satisfy some such condition.  
As a hedge against that possibility, prisoners would have to file federal 
habeas petitions immediately—to stop the 180-day clock if their 
certiorari petitions have not done so.197  That course of action, in 
turn, would put prisoners, respondents, and courts through 
simultaneous litigation in two places (the Supreme Court and a 
federal district court) for the sole purpose of reducing the risk that 
federal habeas adjudication will be lost because of the limitation 
period in § 2263. 
Reading § 2263(b)(1) to be satisfied with any certiorari petition 
creates greater certainty that the 180-day period is tolled and thus 
defuses the inefficiency attending parallel actions.  Yet it opens 
another potential problem.  Prisoners might concoct certiorari 
petitions that fail to comply with filing conditions for the sole 
purpose of suspending the habeas clock.  That problem, however, is 
comparatively tractable.  In most cases, petitions to the Supreme 
Court will meet applicable conditions.  After all, petitions that do not 
will be dismissed summarily.  In cases in which prisoners appear to be 
using demonstrably flawed or untimely certiorari petitions merely to 
toll the filing period for federal habeas (if any there are), 
respondents can complain (if they like), and federal habeas courts can 
decide whether the limitation period in § 2263 warrants dismissal.198 
Finally, the conclusion of the tolling period prescribed by 
§ 2263(b)(1), that is, the “date of final disposition of the petition,” 
should be interpreted to allow time for more proceedings in state 
court.  Usually, the “final” disposition will be the summary denial of a 
petition for certiorari.  When the Court grants review, it will be the 
Court’s judgment and implementing order.  If the Court does not 
affirm in all respects, it typically vacates the judgment and remands to 
the state courts in contemplation of further proceedings there.  In 
those circumstances, tolling should continue while the state courts 
respond and during the time required (and allowed) for pursuing 
Supreme Court review of the new state court decision. 
                                                          
 197. Pace, 544 U.S. at 416 (suggesting this tactic to a prisoner who fears that an 
application for state postconviction relief will not toll the general federal habeas 
limitation period under § 2244(d)(2)). 
 198. This interpretation would not reproduce the arrangements for encouraging 
expeditious petitions that preceded AEDPA.  Under former § 2254 Rule 9(a), a 
federal habeas court was authorized, but not required, to dismiss a petition if it 
appeared that the state had been “prejudiced in its ability to respond.”  
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The “final disposition of the petition” formulation, too, is 
borrowed from the Powell Committee.199  The Committee did not 
address cases in which certiorari is granted, far less the consequences 
for the limitation period of a decision sending a case back to state 
court.  Yet the point of tolling at this stage is to ensure that prisoners 
have the opportunity to pursue direct review in the Court in advance 
of petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus.  It would make no sense to 
force prisoners who are successful on direct review in the Supreme 
Court and find themselves back in state court nonetheless to file 
immediate federal habeas petitions lest they forfeit the chance to 
apply for habeas relief in due course.  It often happens that 
prisoners who win a Supreme Court order vacating a state judgment 
retain federal claims they wish to vindicate in federal habeas.  Both 
the Powell Committee report and the text of § 2263(b)(1) can bear 
the commonsense interpretation that prisoners in that position have 
time to do so.200 
4.  Tolling for state postconviction proceedings 
The tolling period in § 2263(b)(2) runs from “the date on which 
the first petition for post-conviction review or other collateral relief is 
filed until the final State court disposition of such petition.”  This is 
another occasion when the AEDPA drafters eschewed troublesome 
conditions in the Powell Committee’s plan, and consequentially their 
product lends itself to a more appealing interpretation.  The 
Committee had it that only a “properly filed” state petition should 
stop the clock and then only if state filing requirements were met.201  
Section 2263(b)(2) omits both the “properly” modifier and any 
explicit requirement that state filing rules must be satisfied 
seasonably.202  Accordingly, § 2263(b)(2) can and should be read to 
mean that any postconviction petition in state court stops the 180-day 
clock, even if it fails to meet conditions fixed by state law. 
The policy argument for reading § 2263(b)(2) to ignore state filing 
conditions is stronger than the argument we just examined regarding 
§ 2263(b)(1) for tolling while direct review is pursued in the Supreme 
                                                          
 199. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,697. 
 200. A new state court decision reaffirming a conviction or sentence should start a 
new 180-day clock under § 2263(a).  That new clock should be tolled for the time 
required to seek Supreme Court review of the new state judgment.   
 201. See supra text accompanying note 174. 
 202. This section also leaves out any express statement that the proceeding in state 
court must be “pending”—a condition that does appear in § 2244(d)(2).  The 
“pending” requirement has presented interpretive questions.  See, e.g., Evans v. 
Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 192 (2006) (worrying through the peculiar arrangements for 
collateral review in California). 
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Court.  The costs of insisting on a “properly filed” application in this 
instance would be much higher.  Prisoners need not seek certiorari in 
the Supreme Court as a prerequisite to applying to a district court 
for a writ of habeas corpus, and, again, many may recognize that the 
effort is futile.  In § 2263(b)(1) cases, then, the problem with inviting 
litigation in two places at once is diminished for prisoners who are 
willing to forgo certiorari petitions.  Prisoners are, however, obliged to 
pursue any avenues available to test their federal claims in state court 
in advance of federal habeas.  So, in § 2263(b)(2) cases, the problem 
of spawning multiple actions is acute.  Prisoners concerned that an 
application for state postconviction relief may not stop the federal clock 
can protect themselves only by going to state court and federal habeas at 
the same time.  Here again, it makes sense to let any “filed” petition 
suffice and to deal ad hoc with petitions that fail state law conditions. 
Identifying the conclusion of the tolling period established by 
§ 2263(b)(2) entails a reprise of previous arguments regarding the 
baseline date in § 2263(a), which starts the 180-day filing period in 
the first place, as well as the tolling period created by § 2263(b)(1).  
Recall that the Court has already said (in dicta) that § 2263(b)(2) 
restarts the clock with the disposition of a state postconviction petition 
in state court.  But an authoritative interpretation demands a closer look. 
To begin, a “final State court disposition” within the meaning of 
§ 2263(b)(2) should be interpreted to allow for review in the state 
appellate courts.  There is, of course, an expressio unius counter.  
Unlike § 2263(a), § 2263(b)(2) contains no explicit reference to the 
“expiration of the time for seeking . . . review.”  But it would make no 
sense to leave the state appellate courts out, and the text of 
§ 2263(b)(2) can be read to embrace the conventional account of 
when a judgment is “final”—namely, when appellate review, or the 
chance to seek appellate review, is over.  The Powell Committee 
plainly contemplated that “final disposition” of a state postconviction 
petition would be rendered only by “the highest court of the State.”203  
If there were some reason why § 2263(b)(2) might make a trial court 
decision alone sufficient, the failure to deal with the state appellate 
courts explicitly might be significant.  But there is no such reason. 
State trial court decisions are always tentative while they are subject 
to reversal further up the state judicial hierarchy.  That is why 
prisoners must exhaust state appellate means of correcting trial court 
judgments in postconviction proceedings before they can apply for 
federal habeas relief—that is, to give all the organs of state judicial 
                                                          
 203. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,697.   
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power the opportunity to make controlling decisions.  Moreover, if 
the 180-day filing period were not tolled for the time it takes to seek 
direct review in state court, here again knowledgeable prisoners would 
be forced to file parallel federal habeas petitions.  Then, if the state 
appellate courts sustain federal claims, the time, effort, and resources 
spent hurrying petitioners to federal court will have been wasted. 
Both prisoners and state authorities depend on the state appellate 
courts to provide the state’s authoritative judgments on issues that 
affect later federal habeas proceedings.  If state trial courts decide in 
prisoners’ favor, state authorities will want to test their judgments in 
the state appellate courts, and it is only sensible that the federal 
habeas clock should be suspended for that purpose.  Otherwise, 
prisoners would suffer the loss of precious time as they contend with 
state appellate proceedings for which they are not responsible and 
simultaneously press on to federal court.  Consider, too, that trial 
court decisions against prisoners may contain errors that state 
authorities wish to correct in the state appellate courts.204 
Section 2263(b)(2) should also be interpreted to toll the 180-day 
filing period while prisoners or state authorities seek Supreme Court 
review of state appellate decisions rendered in state postconviction 
proceedings.  This again is only to read § 2263(b)(2) to adopt the 
traditional definition of a “final” judgment.  To be sure, the textual 
counter is stronger than the usual expressio unius argument, that is, 
that § 2263(b)(1) expressly refers to Supreme Court review of 
convictions and sentences while § 2263(b)(2) does not.  We said 
earlier that the treatment of Supreme Court proceedings under 
§ 2263(b)(1) makes it implausible to interpret “final State court 
affirmance” in § 2263(a) to adopt the conventional account of 
finality, thus to accommodate the pursuit of Supreme Court review or 
the expiration of the time for filing a certiorari petition.  The same 
argument suggests that “final State court disposition” in § 2263(b)(2) 
also means the end of state court proceedings alone. 
It is also true that the Powell Committee explicitly recommended 
that tolling should not apply “during the pendency of a petition for 
certiorari before the Supreme Court following . . . state post-
conviction review.”205  The Committee explained that prisoners would 
not be disadvantaged, because “all issues raised in state post-
conviction review can be carried forward in a section 2254 petition 
                                                          
 204. For example, a trial court might reject a claim on the merits when procedural 
grounds are available, employ a flawed analysis of the merits, or reach erroneous 
factual findings.  
 205. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,697. 
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and ultimately presented to the Supreme Court” on review of habeas 
judgments reached by the federal district and circuit courts.206  
Moreover, according to the Committee, the Supreme Court rarely 
grants certiorari at this stage, anyway.207 
Nevertheless, reading § 2263(b)(2) to permit time for Supreme 
Court review of state postconviction judgments is consistent with the 
traditional definition of finality and is therefore supported by all the 
familiar arguments for uniformity.  Moreover, it is far from clear that 
this provision endorses the Powell Committee’s recommendation.  
Section 2263(b)(2) does not contain the Committee’s express 
disclaimer of tolling at this stage, but, again, employs language (“final 
State court disposition”) that, standing alone, can be read to embrace 
the normal account of finality. 
There are good reasons why AEDPA may have rejected the Powell 
Committee’s advice and better reasons why a sound interpretation of 
§ 2263(b)(2) today should allow for tolling at this juncture.  The 
Committee assumed what is no longer true.  In 1989, federal claims 
litigated unsuccessfully in state postconviction proceedings could 
usually be considered afresh in federal habeas corpus.  Now, by 
contrast, the federal courts’ authority to adjudicate claims, 
particularly their ability to determine the underlying facts, has been 
drastically curtailed.  The Supreme Court’s capacity to examine 
claims on review of federal habeas judgments has also been curbed.208  
But, if certiorari is granted to review state court judgments rendered 
in state postconviction proceedings, the Court has more freedom of 
action.209  For this reason, the Court may now be more willing than it 
was in the past to accept cases in this posture, and withholding tolling 
for Supreme Court review would have very real costs.210 
Under § 2263(b)(2), the 180-day filing period is tolled from the 
date the “first” petition for state postconviction relief is filed.  The 
modifier “first” appears in no similar tolling provision.  It is not in 
                                                          
 206. Id. at 24,698. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 209. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 343 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(noting that § 2254(d) has no bearing on cases coming up from the state courts). 
 210. The Court held in Lawrence that the tolling provision for habeas cases 
generally, § 2244(d)(2), does not suspend the ordinary one-year limitation period 
for the time during which prisoners seek Supreme Court review of state judgments at 
the postconviction stage.  Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 337.  In so doing, the Court addressed 
some of the arguments described in the text.  But Lawrence does not control the 
meaning of § 2263(b)(2).  Section 2244(d)(2) tolls while an application “for State 
post-conviction or other collateral review” is pending.  The Court read that language 
to be limited to state proceedings, thus to exclude proceedings in the Supreme 
Court.  Cf. infra text accompanying note 216. 
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§ 2244(d)(2), nor in the Powell Committee’s corresponding 
recommendation.  Once again, the task is to identify an 
interpretation that is workable in practice and still true to the text—
here in term “first.” 
Tolling should cover more than a single application in state court.  
Chapter 154 plainly assumes (and fortifies) the general rule that state 
prisoners must exhaust available state means of litigating their federal 
claims before going to federal court.  In a nontrivial number of cases, 
prisoners can satisfy the exhaustion doctrine only by pursuing state 
relief more than once.  State courts may be open to entertain claims 
that were not raised previously.  And if state law offers another 
opportunity for postconviction litigation, it follows that the prisoner 
must use it and, concomitantly, that the prisoner should have time to 
do so.  Inasmuch as the clock for cases subject to Chapter 154 is already 
short, and almost certain to have been largely consumed the first time 
through, tolling for another state application is a virtual necessity. 
Chapter 154 acknowledges that, under certain conditions, 
prisoners also may file second or successive federal petitions.  Recall 
that the provision on stays of execution expressly promises stays when 
prisoners satisfy the conditions for multiple federal applications.211  
By hypothesis, then, some prisoners who have exhausted state 
avenues for adjudicating federal claims and have pursued federal 
habeas relief once will be in a position to press additional claims in 
new federal applications.  The claims in these circumstances are likely 
to be fact-sensitive.212  Since prisoners are required to pursue 
available state court opportunities to develop the facts, they will 
invariably request hearings in state postconviction proceedings.  State 
court hearings, in turn, will typically be the only opportunities 
prisoners have to present new evidence.  Again, prisoners will need 
time to use state proceedings well, and tolling for that purpose will be 
essential.  In a system that contemplates multiple federal habeas 
petitions, a limitation period is unintelligible if it runs relentlessly 
from the conclusion of direct review in state court, with time out only 
for direct review in the Supreme Court and a single petition for state 
postconviction relief. 
There is an interpretation that allows tolling for more than one 
state application, but still respects the modifier “first” in 
§ 2263(b)(2).  It is this.  Section 2263(b)(2) does not occupy the field 
but complements the tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2) for habeas 
                                                          
 211. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
 212. See supra note 81. 
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cases generally.  That general tolling provision in Chapter 153 is 
comparatively restrictive.  It demands that an application for state 
relief be not only filed, but “properly filed” and “pending.”  But it 
does not specify that a qualifying state petition must be a prisoner’s 
first.  True, § 2244(d)(2) ties its tolling rule to a limitation period 
“under this subsection”—presumably meaning § 2244(d).  But we 
have seen that provisions in Chapter 153 apply to cases subject to 
Chapter 154.  It is possible, then, to read § 2244(d)(2) to operate in 
death penalty cases from covered states and to toll any federal habeas 
limitation period for any “properly filed” postconviction application 
“pending” in state court.213 
The two tolling provisions, § 2263(b)(2) and § 2244(d)(2), thus 
work in tandem.  In the subset of cases subject to Chapter 154, 
§ 2263(b)(2) tolls the 180-day period from the date that a prisoner’s 
“first” state petition for postconviction relief is “filed” until final 
disposition.  Here, too, an application is “filed” even if it is subject to 
dismissal for failure to comport with state filing conditions.  This 
arrangement is sensible to avoid distracting threshold arguments, the 
better to accelerate litigation in capital cases.  Then, if the prisoner is 
in a position to file a second or successive state petition, he or she can 
secure the necessary tolling via § 2244(d)(2).  In that event, only a 
petition that is “properly filed” and “pending” will do.  The attempt 
to speed capital cases along has failed in the special circumstances of 
a second or successive state petition, so tolling is governed by the 
ordinary arrangements prescribed in § 2244(d)(2). 
This is not to contend that the AEDPA drafters thought tolling matters 
through in this way or, indeed, that they thought tolling matters through 
at all.  It is perfectly clear that they failed to appreciate the need for 
tolling in the various circumstances that arise.  Probably they inserted 
the “first” term in § 2263(b)(2) with the naïve intent to restrict tolling 
in death penalty cases to a single state petition, without recognizing 
that such a rule would be untenable.  Yet the point of the exercise is 
not to discover and effectuate what anyone actually meant this term 
                                                          
 213. The tolling provisions in § 2263(b)(1) and § 2263(b)(2) are linked to the 
180-day rule in § 2263(a) in the sense that § 2263(a) establishes the limitation period 
for cases subject to Chapter 154, and the tolling provisions applicable to that filing 
period, too, operate only when Chapter 154 is triggered.  But nothing in Chapter 154 
makes these timing rules exclusive of the rules for all habeas cases residing in 
Chapter 153.  By contrast, Chapter 154 makes it clear on various occasions that the 
death penalty cases to which its provisions apply are also governed by the general 
body of habeas law captured in Chapter 153.  See supra note 38 and accompanying text.   
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to mean, but to arrive at a workable interpretation that makes peace 
with the text Congress enacted into law.214 
There is no plausible way to interpret § 2263(b)(2) to toll the 180-
day filing period while a habeas petition is before a federal court.  
This is regrettable.  The Supreme Court has held that the general 
tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2) does not stop the one-year clock 
established by § 2244(d)(1).215  The result has been ugly.  A prisoner 
who files a habeas application in federal court within the limitation 
period still can be turned out if the district court later dismisses on 
curable procedural grounds—for example, a failure to exhaust state 
remedies.  At that point, there may be little or no time to correct the 
error and resume federal habeas proceedings.  A prisoner who 
worries that lodging a federal petition will not stop the clock must file 
a simultaneous postconviction petition in state court—in hopes that 
one application or the other will achieve the necessary tolling.  Once 
again, a habeas provision ostensibly meant to expedite litigation ends 
up inviting a multiplicity of suits. 
One is tempted to contend that § 2263(b)(2) does stop the clock 
for federal proceedings even if § 2244(d)(2) does not.  Section 
2244(d)(2) provides for tolling while an “application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review” is “pending.”  The Court has 
read the term “State” to modify both “post-conviction” and “other 
collateral review,” with the consequence that § 2244(d)(2) tolls only 
for proceedings in state court and not for the time a habeas petition 
is pending in a federal court.216  Under § 2263(b)(2), however, a 
petition that initiates tolling is one seeking “post-conviction review or 
other collateral relief.”  The “State” modifier does not appear, inviting 
the expressio unius interpretation that § 2263(b)(2) tolls the filing 
period for federal habeas as well as for state postconviction proceedings. 
Trouble is, we have just seen that the rest of § 2263(b)(2) plainly 
cuts the other way.  Tolling continues “until the final State court 
disposition of such petition.”  It seems clear that “such petition” 
cannot be a federal petition, but rather must be an application for 
state relief.  The language § 2263(b)(2) employs is different from the 
text of § 2244(d)(2), but the meaning is inescapably the same.  This 
is an occasion when we must forgo an attractive interpretation of 
Chapter 154 and bow to the text as written.  The costs will be heavy.  
                                                          
 214. Alternatively, equity can accommodate cases in which tolling is necessary for 
a second or successive state petition.  See infra text accompanying note 223.  
 215. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001). 
 216. Id. at 181–82.  The relevant Powell Committee recommendation specified a 
“request for post-conviction review pending before a state court.”  See supra note 174 
and accompanying text. 
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The short 180-day clock vastly increases the chances that time will run 
out while a federal court decides whether a habeas petition can be 
entertained.  Some of the pressure can be relieved by holding federal 
petitions in abeyance while prisoners exhaust state court remedies—
provided “cause” is shown for failing to satisfy the exhaustion 
doctrine in the first instance.217  That arrangement is not optimal.  
But it may answer in some cases.  The repeal of the “total exhaustion” 
rule in § 2264 will also mitigate these difficulties, though not enough 
to be satisfying.218 
A third tolling provision, § 2263(b)(3), authorizes a district court 
to give a prisoner additional time, “not to exceed 30 days,” if the 
prisoner moves for “an extension” in the district court “that would 
have jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus 
application” and shows “good cause” for “the failure to file the . . . 
application within the time period established by this section.”  This 
provision follows the relevant Powell Committee recommendation, 
albeit the Committee proposed that extensions of sixty days should 
be permissible.219  The Committee explained that the “good cause” 
standard is meant for cases in which “counsel experiences some 
difficulty in filing” a habeas petition within the 180-day period.220  
Nothing suggests that § 2263(b)(3) uses “good cause” to enact a 
more structured, doctrinal test.221  The sensible reading, then, is that 
this provision enables district courts to examine extension motions ad 
hoc and to exercise judgment—subject to appellate review for an 
abuse of discretion.222 
5.  Equitable tolling 
Section 2263 should be read to contemplate tolling the 180-day 
limitation period not only as Congress has provided in § 2263(b), but 
also as courts may determine on equitable grounds.  A limitation 
period is subject to equitable tolling unless the language of the 
statute, or the context in which it operates, dislodges the default 
position.  Neither § 2244(d), which fixes a one-year filing period for 
                                                          
 217. See supra text accompanying note 89. 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 131–33. 
 219. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 220. POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24,698. 
 221. See supra text accompanying note 96 (describing the unique definition the 
Supreme Court has assigned to “cause” in habeas cases in which prisoners fail to 
satisfy state procedural rules for litigating federal claims).  Cf. Rhines v. Weber, 544 
U.S. 269, 279 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) (reading the “good cause” standard for 
staying a federal petition while state remedies are exhausted not to be a “strict and 
inflexible requirement”).  
 222. See supra text accompanying note 198. 
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habeas cases generally, nor § 2263, which governs death penalty cases 
subject to Chapter 154, explicitly forestalls equitable tolling.  The 
Supreme Court has held that the limitation period in § 2244(d) can 
be equitably tolled.223  The same conclusion should be reached 
regarding § 2263. 
There is, of course, an expressio unius argument that, by legislating 
certain occasions for tolling, § 2263(b) forecloses additional judicial 
tolling.  The Court rejected a similar argument with respect to 
§ 2244(d).  There, the Court explained that the pertinent provisions 
in § 2244(d)(1), paragraphs (B)–(D), do not toll the one-year clock 
after it has started, but rather specify when the clock begins ticking in 
the first place.224  As we have seen, § 2263 prescribes only one beginning 
date for the 180-day filing period, together with three express tolling 
provisions.  This, however, is a distinction without a difference.  A 
statute that restarts a limitation period is the functional equivalent of a 
tolling provision; the two forms reflect only drafting techniques.225 
The Court has acknowledged that § 2244(d)(2) is an explicit 
tolling provision and nonetheless rejected the possibility that it 
precludes equitable tolling of the one-year limitation period in 
§ 2244(d)(1).226  Prisoners must exhaust state remedies before 
applying for federal habeas, and § 2244(d)(2) allows them time to do 
so.227  That explanation works as well with respect to the tolling 
provision in § 2263(b)(2), which also largely ensures that prisoners 
can exhaust state postconviction remedies. 
Tolling under § 2263(b)(1) cannot be explained on the same basis 
inasmuch as it extends to proceedings in the Supreme Court, which 
prisoners have no obligation to pursue prior to federal habeas.  Yet 
there is another, independent reason for an express provision tolling 
the 180-day limitation period while a prisoner petitions for certiorari.  
As we have seen, § 2263(b)(1) effectuates the familiar understanding 
that a state court judgment is final only when the Supreme Court 
disposes of a certiorari petition or the time for filing a petition 
expires.228  But for § 2263(b)(1), the provision in § 2263(a) starting 
the 180-day clock when a state court affirms a conviction and 
sentence might have suggested that § 2263 abandons the traditional 
definition of finality.  Just as § 2263(b) ensures (via statutory tolling) 
that the conventional definition is preserved, § 2263(b) equally 
                                                          
 223. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 641 (2010). 
 224. Id. at 647–48. 
 225. Id. at 661 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 226. Id. at 649 (majority opinion). 
 227. Id. at 648–49. 
 228. See supra text accompanying note 190. 
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clarifies (also via statutory tolling) that prisoners have time to go to 
the Supreme Court if they choose to do so. 
Nor should the provision for a thirty-day extension under 
§ 2263(b)(3) be read to preempt equitable tolling.  An extension, 
too, may be linked to the exhaustion requirement—for example, 
when state proceedings are concluded only a short time before the 
180-day limitation period is due to expire.  And, here again, there is 
an independent reason for singling out authority for an extension.  
Following the Powell Committee, § 2263(b)(3) simply accommodates 
cases in which counsel needs a bit more time to prepare and file a 
habeas petition.  Nothing in § 2263 (but silence) supports the 
argument that brief extensions for “good cause” occupy the field to 
the exclusion of equitable tolling.229 
The conditions that justify equitable tolling in habeas cases cannot 
very well be specified.  The point is that courts have authority to 
examine cases ad hoc, and the judgments required will not be easy.  
The burden will be relieved a bit in cases governed by § 2244(d)(1), 
inasmuch as paragraphs (B)–(D) already allow more time in 
compelling circumstances—namely, when state authorities have 
impeded a prisoner’s ability to file a timely habeas petition, when the 
Supreme Court recognizes a novel claim that is cognizable in federal 
collateral proceedings, and when new evidence is discovered to 
support a more conventional claim.  Courts will perforce have more 
responsibility in cases subject to § 2263, in which those scenarios are 
not covered by statutory tolling provisions.  But circumstances that 
Congress has identified as justifying more time in general habeas 
litigation should inform the conditions that courts conclude warrant 
equitable tolling in death penalty cases subject to Chapter 154.  We 
would scarcely infer that by placing paragraphs (B)–(D) in 
§ 2244(d)(1), and omitting similar provisions from § 2263, Congress 
has signaled that equitable tolling should not be allowed when the same 
or similar circumstances appear in § 2263 cases.230  Quite the opposite.231 
                                                          
 229. This is not to say that explanations that count as “good cause” for an 
extension cannot overlap with justifications for equitable tolling.  It is only to say that 
the conditions that satisfy the “good cause” standard for extremely brief extensions 
of an already-accelerated filing period in capital cases can scarcely capture anyone’s 
idea of all the circumstances in which equity warrants allowing more time. 
 230. In Holland v. Florida, the Court cited Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 53 
(2002), for the proposition that an express statutory tolling provision does not 
necessarily foreclose equitable tolling.  560 U.S. 631, 648 (2010). 
 231. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 663 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court 
had not suggested that “any of § 2244(d)’s exceptions go beyond what equity would 
have allowed”). 
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6.  Equitable exceptions 
Just as the 180-day rule should be interpreted to allow for equitable 
tolling, it also should be understood to accommodate equitable 
exceptions.  Procedural restrictions on federal habeas have long 
given way where their application would result in a “miscarriage of 
justice.”232  We have seen that this exception opens the door to the 
federal courts in the absence of a clear statutory prohibition.  The 
Supreme Court has held that a prisoner who makes a credible 
showing of actual innocence need not satisfy the one-year limitation 
period established by § 2244(d)(1).233  Nothing in § 2263 disclaims 
the “miscarriage of justice” exception.  Accordingly, § 2263 should be 
given a similar interpretation.  Consistent with the precedents in 
other default contexts, this exception to the 180-day filing period 
should also operate if a prisoner shows that he or she is ineligible for 
the death penalty.234 
7.  Timetables for federal adjudication 
In addition to the timing rules in § 2263 for initiating federal 
habeas proceedings, Chapter 154 contains timetables for the 
adjudication of habeas corpus cases once they arrive in federal court.  
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2266, district and circuit courts alike must give 
death penalty cases from covered states priority over “all noncapital 
matters.”  The “general congestion” of a court’s calendar is no excuse 
for “delay.”235  District courts typically must render judgments within 
450 days after a petition is filed; circuit courts generally must reach 
final determinations within 120 days after the reply brief.  Various 
provisions specify precisely how these timetables are to be computed 
and account for foreseeable contingencies. 
The Powell Committee proposed nothing along these lines.  One 
suspects that the judges who sat on the Committee did not regard 
poor case management in the federal courts as a significant 
contributing cause of delays in capital litigation.  Congress instructs 
federal courts on the way to administer their dockets in other ways 
and in other contexts.  Yet, by comparison, § 2266 is 
micromanagement in an especially single-minded form.  The federal 
courts are notoriously overbooked and understaffed.  District courts 
can recruit magistrate judges to service in the first instance, and 
                                                          
 232. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 233. McQuiggen v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1934 (2013). 
 234. See supra text accompanying note 167. 
 235. 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(1)(C)(iii) (2012). 
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circuit courts have staff lawyers to help them digest appeals.  Still, the 
courts will be taxed to keep to the new timetables. 
The pragmatic answer is an interpretation of § 2266 to be 
hortatory, serving as a guide to federal courts processing capital 
habeas cases but imposing no routinely enforceable strictures.  The 
courts have taken this approach to AEDPA amendments to Chapter 
153 that presume to set timetables for judicial determinations.236  
They can and should develop similar arrangements to cope with 
§ 2266.  If the problems with implementing § 2266 prove to be 
insurmountable, Congress may relent.  Indeed, Congress has already 
done so.  As originally enacted, § 2266 allowed district courts only 180 
days to reach decisions; the USA PATRIOT Act extended the period 
to 450 days.237  In the background, of course, lie constitutional 




The timing rules in Chapter 154 will impose a hectic schedule on 
capital habeas litigation.  Yet these rules are open to pragmatic 
interpretations that make the best of a poorly conceived scheme.  
The 180-day rule is not jurisdictional, but rather establishes a 
limitation period subject to both statutory and equitable tolling.  The 
180-day clock is stopped during the same periods for which the 
general one-year limitation period in Chapter 153 is either postponed 
or suspended in all habeas actions.  Substantially parallel 
arrangements for noncapital cases do not deprive Chapter 154 of 
significance.  There is an enormous difference between six months 
and a full year—a difference that is magnified inasmuch as capital 
cases are invariably more complex and justly time-consuming.  Yet 






                                                          
 236. Gray-Bey v. United States, 201 F.3d 866, 867–68 (7th Cir. 2000) (collecting 
circuit precedents).   
 237. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 238. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 349–50 (2000) (acknowledging as much); 
see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (explaining that federal courts need 
flexibility to avoid “justice on the fly”).  See generally William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment:  
A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 805 
(1997) (contending that the timetables in § 2266 are suspect on these grounds). 
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*** 
CONCLUSION 
It will not be long now before Chapter 154 will become applicable 
to capital habeas cases from some states.  I have grappled in this 
article with the principal interpretive questions that will have to be 
addressed.  I have contended that most of the provisions in Chapter 
154 are best understood to contemplate arrangements for capital 
litigation that roughly approximate the rules and procedures that 
AEDPA’s amendments to Chapter 153 and the Supreme Court’s 
decisions have already established across the board.  The long 
gestation period for the new habeas corpus in death penalty cases has 
meant that it will be born into a different world on which it will have 
modest impact. 
